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Silence is Golden, Leaden, and Copper
Disclosure of Material Environmental Information in the
Hard Rock Mining Industry
Robert Repetto

Abstract
The requirements applicable to hard rock mining companies listed on U.S. or Canadian
stock exchanges for financial disclosure of material environmental information are
summarized. Ten financially material environmental events that occurred to ten such
mining companies in recent years are reviewed to explore to what extent the companies
had complied with such requirements. These events included dam failures, increases in
remediation liabilities, increased bonding requirements, and other environmentallyrelated changes. The most common shortcomings in disclosure were found in the failure
of the Management Discussion & Analysis section of company financial reports to
disclose material risks and uncertainties known to management which were likely to
result in material changes in financial conditions and results.
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Silence is Golden, Leaden, and Copper
Disclosure of Material Environmental Information in the
Hard Rock Mining Industry
Robert Repetto

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Full disclosure of material information1 by publicly owned companies is obviously
crucial for the efﬁcient functioning of capital markets and for the protection of
investors, as recent corporate scandals have underscored. Full disclosure has therefore
long been the foundation of U.S. and Canadian securities law and regulation. It has
also long been recognized that some environmental information is material and must
be disclosed. Disclosure, can forestall attempts by corporate managers to boost shortterm proﬁtability by measures that are not in the long-term interests of shareholders,
including efforts to conceal environmental liabilities or to pursue risky environ
mental policies. There are increasing demands from shareholders, including large
institutional investors, for fuller disclosure of environmental information. Securities
regulators, environmental protection agencies and other government bodies have also
expressed concern about the inadequacy of such disclosures.
In the securities laws of both the United States and Canada, the fundamental rule
is that all material information must be promptly disclosed. In both countries,
existing law requires disclosure in the Management Discussion & Analysis sections of
ﬁnancial reports of risks and uncertainties known to management that would be
reasonably likely to cause future ﬁnancial results and conditions to differ materially
from those currently reported. In addition, there are speciﬁc requirements for the
disclosure of material environmental information, including the current and future
ﬁnancial impacts of environmental regulations and environmental risk factors that
might have a material effect on the enterprise. Environmental liabilities, such as the

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

1

Information is material,
according to Canadian and
U.S. law, if reasonable
investors would find it rele
vant to their investment deci
sions.

4

2

Material events included
those involving bankruptcies;
abrupt and large percentage
movements in the company’s
stock price; denials in
operating permits to exploit
important properties; or
increases in financial
liabilities and obligations
that were significant in the
context of the company’s
overall balance sheet. The
financial magnitude of the
events selected for
investigation left little doubt
of their materiality.
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future costs of closure and reclamation of mining sites, must be disclosed unless the
ﬁrm can make a determination that such expenditures are not reasonably likely to be
necessary, or, if necessary, not ﬁnancially material. In disclosing such liabilities, ﬁrms
must reveal a probable range of costs even if no single ﬁgure can be determined.
These environmental disclosure rules are particularly applicable to hard rock
mining companies because their operations typically have signiﬁcant environmental
impacts and require extensive reclamation when concluded. In the past, mining
companies have understated environmental risks and liabilities, such as closure and
reclamation costs, and have declared bankruptcy when mining has ceased, leaving
costly environmental clean-up operations to the public sector.
The study reported here investigated the adequacy of Canadian and U.S. mining
companies’ disclosures of material environmental information. The methodology of
the study consisted of the following steps:
First, a number of recent events were identiﬁed that 1) occurred to publicly-traded
mining companies listed on U.S. or Canadian stock markets; 2) had material2
ﬁnancial signiﬁcance for those companies and their investors or creditors; 3) were
related to the companies’ environmental exposures, performances, obligations, or
liabilities.
Second, the ﬁnancial ﬁlings and press releases of the company involved in each
event before, after, and at the time of the event were examined to learn what the com
pany had disclosed about each of the events. For U.S. companies, this involved
reviewing 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K forms. For Canadian companies, it involved reviewing
annual information forms, press releases and other periodic and special disclosures.
Third, the background and context of each event was investigated to learn what the
company involved knew or was in a position to know about the event when and after
it happened and what it was in a position to know about the possibility or likelihood
of the event before it occurred. This phase was carried out by examining reports, stud
ies and other material prepared by government agencies, consultants or other experts
that would have been available to the company and other parties at speciﬁc times.
Summaries of the case studies carried out with this methodology are given below.
In all but one of the case studies, disclosures were found to be deﬁcient, especially
in the disclosure to investors of known material environmental risks and liabilities.
This ﬁnding lends weight to recent calls for stricter enforcement by securities regula
tors of existing environmental disclosure requirements and for better compliance by
publicly listed companies with current environmental disclosure rules.
Canyon Resources, Inc. – The Kendall Mine, Montana, USA

The Kendall gold mine in Lewiston, Montana, is owned and operated by Canyon
Resources, Inc. The company’s $1.86 million reclamation performance bond had
existed since 1989. In October 1999, the Montana Department of Environmental
Quality, after reviewing the costs of cleaning up the cyanide leach pad and other mine
works, increased the required bond to $8.3 million. This increase was a material amount
for the company relative to its total and current assets of $81.8 and $13.6 million at the
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end of 1998. On August 21, 2000, the DEQ raised the bond amount to $14.2 million.
Prior to October 1999, Canyon Resources knew that its reclamation bond was under
review by the Montana DEQ, so the possibility that the required bond might be raised
by a material amount was an uncertainty known to management prior to the event
and had to be disclosed under Item 303(d).
The company did disclose this material uncertainty in its 1998 10-K ﬁling on April
7, 1999. The report’s MD&A stated, “The DEQ requires the Company to maintain a
$1,869,000 Reclamation Bond to ensure appropriate reclamation. The DEQ is cur
rently reviewing the adequacy of the bond amount and the Company anticipates that
the DEQ will require a bond increase, but cannot presently predict the amount of any
such increase.”
Moreover, in the company’s third quarter 10-Q ﬁling, dated September 30, 1999, it
promptly disclosed the increased bond amount. Next year, in its quarterly 10-Q ﬁling
for September 30, 2000, the company stated, “In August, 2000, the DEQ further
revised the bond amount to approximately $14.2 million. The company believes the
DEQ bond amount exceeds the cost of remaining work and has filed an
administrative appeal to the DEQ’s actions.”3 In subsequent disclosures through the
third quarter of 2003, the company discussed its ongoing controversy with the DEQ
over reclamation at the Kendall mine, including information that in February 2002
the DEQ had decided that a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement would
be required to guide the remaining reclamation, which the company said would
needlessly delay work and increase costs.
In conclusion, Canyon Resources did promptly disclose material information, as
required, and provided the required warning regarding a material uncertainty known
to management.
Hecla Mining Company – Coeur d’Alene Basin, Idaho, USA

A century’s mining and smelting by many companies in Idaho’s Coeur d’Alene basin
resulted in such extensive metals pollution that a 21 square mile area was made one
of the nation’s ﬁrst Superfund sites in 1983. In February 1998, EPA started to study
whether a much bigger area should be included in the site, which a federal court
afﬁrmed in June 2000. EPA’s draft Remediation Investigation/Feasibility Study,
describing clean-up options in the larger area with costs ranging from $194 to $2,600
million, was released for comment in June 2000 and ﬁnalized in July 2001. In
September 2001 EPA’s Record of Decision chose an option with a present value cost
of $360 million, excluding the costs of cleaning up the original smaller site.
Meanwhile, in March 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice sued the company for
recovery of clean-up costs and natural resource damages over the entire basin. In
September 2003, the trial’s ﬁrst phase was decided, assigning Hecla a 31 percent
liability for whatever damages were subsequently determined.
Although Hecla disclosed material events related to the Coeur d’Alene/Bunker Hill
Superfund site as they occurred and warned investors that these events may have
material adverse effects on the company, disclosure fell short on three counts.
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Canyon Resources, Inc., 10-Q
report, Third Quarter,
September 20, 2000, notes
to CFS, Commitments and
Contingencies, (a) Site
Restoration Costs, p.11.
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First, after the court assigned a 31 percent liability to Hecla, the EPA’s Record of
Decision with respect to clean-up costs in the wider basin (Operating Unit 3), and the
estimated costs of cleaning up the Bunker Hill “Box” (Operating Units 1 and 2), it was
implausible that the potential liability of $18 million that the company disclosed was
as likely as any other ﬁgure or that the range of $18 to $58 million captured the com
pany’s potential liability, for the following reasons:
●

●

●

Within Operating Units 1 and 2, the total clean-up expenditures were esti
mated in a GAO study at about $212 million, most of which was borne by
state and federal agencies and is included in the amounts the government
seeks to recover in part from Hecla based on its 31 percent liability.
The EPA’s Record of Decision estimated a $359 million discounted present
cost for the preferred remediation option for Unit 3, of which 31 percent is
$111 million.
Although the trial judge opined that the plaintiffs had exaggerated natural
resource damages, the alleged damages exceeded a billion dollars, based on
contamination in a 1,500 square mile area over a period extending decades
into the past and decades into the future. It is questionable that the most
likely trial outcome is that damages will be found to be negligible.

Second, current regulations require a company to disclose the assumptions under
lying its liability estimates. Hecla has not done this with respect to the liability it has
accrued for the Coeur d’Alene site.
Third, from the time the government sued the company for damages and cost
recovery in 1996 to the time of the court’s assignment of substantial liability to Hecla
in 2003, events indicated the company’s increasing ﬁnancial exposure to the basin’s
problems. These events included a court’s afﬁrmation that the wider basin could be
included in the CERCLA action, the release of the EPA’s draft RI/FS report with its
range of costs, the Record of Decision indicating a discounted present cost of $360
million for the preferred option, and ﬁnally the decision of the ﬁrst phase of the trial
assigning Hecla 31 percent liability. As seen through the eyes of management, this
increasing ﬁnancial risk to the company must have been obvious, given the efforts it
made through negotiation, legal and political channels to limit the company’s expo
sure. Nonetheless, the Management Discussion & Analysis sections of ﬁnancial
reports over this period provide little such guidance beyond an indication that unfa
vorable outcomes could have material adverse consequences.
4

Mining Watch Canada and
The Sierra Club of Canada.
“TOXICanada: Thirteen Good
Reasons to Establish a Clean
Canada Fund” [online]. July 1,
2001. Available:
http://www.miningwatch.ca
/publications/toxic_13.html.
11-23-03.

Anvil Range Mining Company – The Faro Mine

In 1994, Anvil Range Mining Company purchased the Faro zinc and lead mine in the
Yukon from a receiver for the assets of Curragh Resources, which went bankrupt in
1992. Anvil operated the mine into 1997 but declared bankruptcy in April of 1998,4
though in the fall of 1997 the company had declared assets of $162.5 million and lia
bilities of $93.8 million. However, the present value cost of closing and cleaning up
the Faro mine had been estimated in 1993 at $124 million, against which Anvil held a
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Reclamation Securities Trust containing $12.5 million in 1998. In November 1994
Anvil Range had agreed to fund the Trust from operating revenues with contributions
varying with the net price of zinc. In October 1995 Anvil Range had also recognized a
liability of $43.5 million for environmental remediation on the property, having
adopted Curragh’s assumptions that reprocessing of tailings and lower reclamation
standards would bring the costs well below those estimated in 1993.
Under this arrangement, falling zinc prices lowered the company’s contributions
to the Reclamation Securities Trust at the same time that the reprocessing of tailings
became less economical, raising the company’s reclamation liabilities. The company
never made this risk clear as zinc prices ﬂuctuated nor did it disclose a current
estimate of the environmental liability in the event that reprocessing of tailings
proved infeasible. By 1998, when the company declared bankruptcy, inﬂation and the
increased volume of waste materials had raised the previous estimated cost of $125
million to the $145-150 million range, more than enough to make the company
insolvent.
The company consistently stated in its ﬁnancial disclosures that it expected the
amounts accumulating in the RST to be adequate to meet its closure and reclamation
obligations at Faro. Thus, up to the brink of bankruptcy, Anvil Range continued to
maintain that it had adequately provided for reclamation of the Faro mine and failed
to disclose its increasing liability as its strategy for funding the reclamation
disintegrated.
Manhattan Minerals Corporation – The Tambogrande Mine, Peru

Manhattan Minerals Corporation is a Canadian mining company devoted interna
tionally to the exploration and development of mining properties. Its shares trade on
the Toronto Stock Exchange. Its principal asset was a concession to develop a gold
mine in Tambogrande, Peru, acquired in 1997 from President Fujimori by supreme
decree. There was persistent opposition to the mine in Tambogrande since deposits
lie under the town itself and mining operations were thought to be a potential threat
to proﬁtable commercial agricultural production. A company-funded Environmental
Impact Study and discussions between the company and community organizations
over several years failed to overcome opposition. On October 11th, 2002, the local gov
ernment announced that a popular referendum would be held and on June 2, 2002,
the residents of the town where the mine would be located conducted a referendum
on the question of whether the mine project should go forward. Over 93 percent of
those participating voted “No”.
Manhattan Minerals’ stock price fell by approximately 30 percent in the following
days. Moreover, in September 2002, the company announced that due to “volatility in
equity markets,” the company was postponing a private placement and re-pricing
signiﬁcantly downwards share purchase warrants that it had issued a year earlier. This
increased the company’s difﬁculties in demonstrating to the Peruvian government
that it had the ﬁnancing to develop the concession property, a question then at issue.
In December 2003, this issue formed the announced basis for the government’s
decision that Manhattan Minerals had not fulﬁlled the ﬁnancial requirements of the
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project and had forfeited its concession rights. Therefore, the referendum was clearly
a material ﬁnancial event for the company.
Throughout 2001 and 2002, the company’s press releases and ﬁnancial reports dis
cussed its consultations with the community and progress in carrying out the
Environmental Impact Assessment. However, the ﬁrst mention of the referendum
came in a press release dated February 14, 2002, in which the company declared:
“On February 10, 2002 the Ministry of Energy and Mines published in the
ofﬁcial gazette its resolution to enforce existing laws in Peru that prevent local
municipalities from calling referendums on issues which conﬂict with
National laws. Speciﬁcally, the Government of Peru has now publicly stated
their legal findings that a referendum on mining in the District of
TamboGrande is not legal and that the Government will enforce the existing
laws against such a referendum through the National Prosecutor if necessary.”
No indication was given in that release that the popular referendum constituted a
material risk to the company’s project or plans or a risk to investors.
The company’s disclosures did not mention the impending resolution again until
June 2, 2002, the day of the voting, when it issued a press release attacking the
referendum and re-emphasizing its illegality. Results were not disclosed until the
following day.
In summary, the strong local opposition to Manhattan Mineral’s project in
Tambogrande, culminating in an overwhelmingly negative vote in the community
referendum in June 2002, was a material risk and a known uncertainty in the months
leading up to the voting. The overwhelmingly negative vote in that poll resulted in a
signiﬁcant loss to shareholders and contributed to the challenge facing the company
in attracting the capital needed to meet the ﬁnancial conditions in its concession
agreement. The company’s disclosures in the months prior to the referendum did not
disclose this risk adequately to investors.
Cambior – The Omai Mine, Guyana

Overnight between August 19 and 20, 1995, the tailings dam failed at Cambior’s Omai
gold mine in Guyana, releasing approximately 4 million cubic meters of cyanideladen mine waste into the Omai river, which feeds into the Essequibo, which
eventually runs through the capital city of Georgetown. Cambior’s stock plummeted
23 percent from Friday, August 18, 1995, to Monday, August 21, 1995. Trading volume
went from about 27,000 on the 18th to about 3.7 million on the 21st. Moreover, the dam
remained closed for months while the failure was investigated and a new tailings
impoundment was constructed, resulting in substantial loss of income and additional
costs for the company.
At the time of the failure, the amount of ﬂuid in storage was eight times larger than
the maximum allowable amount speciﬁed in the project’s 1991 Environmental Impact
Statement, which was the only operating plan in existence for the Omai mine project.
The impoundment’s cyanide content was many times higher than permitted in
releases to the river.

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

robert repetto

In addition, according to the report5 of the Dam Review Team to the Guyana
Geology and Mines Committee, appointed to study the dam failure, the failure result
ed from ﬂaws in the dam’s design and construction.
“It is our current judgment that failure of the dam was caused by massive
loss of core integrity resulting from internal erosion of the dam ﬁll, a process
also known as piping. This means simply that ﬁner particles from one soil
moved freely under the inﬂuence of seepage forces into and through the
interstitial voids of adjacent coarser soil due to excessive disparity between
particle sizes of the two soils, allowing cavities and tunnels to develop with
in the dam.”

9

5

“Technical Causation of the
Omai Tailings Dam Failure.”
Submitted to Guyana Geology
and Mines Commission by
Dam Review Team, November
16, 1995.

“In basic terms then, the rock ﬁll adjacent to the ﬁlter sand was simply too
coarse to prevent the sand from washing into and through it, and both
potential and actual problems this produced appear to have gone unrecog
nized or uncorrected throughout the sequence of design and construction
until the failure occurred.”
The Dam Review Committee thus found that the failure was caused primarily by
faulty design and construction that went unrecognized or uncorrected. Evidence from
other sources indicates that the problems were not unknown, but remained
uncorrected. The Commission of Enquiry quoted from faxes between the resident
engineer supervising the company’s employees constructing the dam and the
engineering ﬁrm’s head ofﬁce in September 1992, when the ﬁrst stage of the dam was
under construction. The resident engineer pointed out that with respect to the grades
of rock ﬁll adjacent to the ﬁlter sand, “It is fairly certain that the selected run of mine
waste will not satisfy this speciﬁcation. Is there room for coarsening the speciﬁcation?”
The reply came back: “. . . basically we will accept the ﬁnest of the run of mine muck
which should be fairly close to spec (i.e., some coarsening of spec is acceptable.)”6
The Review Team also found that a corrugated steel diversion conduit through the
dam had leaked, contributing to the dam’s internal erosion. Again, the Commission
of Enquiry cited communications between the project engineer and his home ofﬁce
during dam construction discussing whether to grout and reinforce the conduit with
cement. The decision was not to do so, but to accept the risk that the culvert would
collapse.
Cambior disclosed the dam failure and subsequent events in a series of press
releases and ﬁnancial reports starting in 1995. However, prior to the event, there was
no mention in any of the company’s Management Discussion & Analysis ﬁlings that
the build-up of liquid behind the dam to volumes many times greater than its design
capacity, combined with known ﬂaws in the design and construction of the dam, con
stituted a known material risk or uncertainty. Since the company had known as early
as 1992 and 1993 that ﬂaws in the construction of the dam posed risks of failure, it is
hard to imagine that those risks, combined with the large volumes of liquids with
high cyanide concentrations in storage, did not appear through the eyes of manage
ment to pose material risks to the company and its investors.

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

6

Report of the Commission of
Inquiry, p. 40.

10

silence is golden, leaden, and copper

Royal Oak Mining, Ltd. – The Giant Mine, Northwest Territories, Canada

7

Royal Oak Mines Inc.
“Quarterly Report.” USSEC. 11
16-98. Available: www.sec.gov.

Royal Oak Mining Ltd. declared bankruptcy in April 1999, citing low gold prices,
although Royal Oak’s third quarter 1998 report listed assets totaling $840.3 million
and liabilities totaling $645.8 million.7 The latter excluded the cost of dealing with
240,000 tons of highly toxic arsenic trioxide buried in underground mining vaults in
its Giant Mine in Yellowknife in the Northwest Territories that were leaching arsenic
into ground and surface waters. Recent engineering estimates of the costs of closure
and remediation are approximately $200 million, against which the government held
a $0.4 million performance bond for water quality reclamation.
The Giant Mine went into production in 1948 using a roasting operation to extract
gold from its arsenopyrite ore, producing arsenic trioxide dust as a waste product.
The arsenic trioxide dust that was collected was blown underground into mined out
and some specially constructed chambers for storage 20 to 75 meters below the sur
face. After 50 years of mining operations, approximately 240,000 tons of arsenic tri
oxide dust had accumulated underground. Approximately 10-13 tons were added
every day over the last few decades.
Royal Oak Mines acquired ownership in 1990 and operated the mine from then until
April 1999, when it went into bankruptcy. At low gold prices, Giant Mine became a
break-even operation. Royal Oak Mines went into receivership in April 1999 with no
provisions to deal with the arsenic trioxide problem, which was left to the federal
government. Extracting it would be difﬁcult to accomplish without endangering
workers’ health, since arsenic trioxide can be lethal if inhaled or absorbed through the
skin and extraction would leave open the question of suitable long-term surface storage.
At present, after ten years of engineering studies, the government is supporting a plan
to freeze the arsenic underground and let the arctic permafrost hold it in place, at a dis
counted present cost of about $100 million. Under this scenario, the pumps would have
to keep running until the arsenic has leached out of backﬁlled chambers and vaults,
which would add an additional $100 million in discounted present costs to the bill.
Royal Oak never recognized a liability for reclamation of the stored arsenic
trioxide nor did it discuss the problem in its ﬁnancial reports. It did provide for
reclamation of the surface area under the terms of its lease. According to language in
its 1997 and 1998 annual ﬁnancial ﬁling: “. . . the Company believes that it has made
adequate ﬁnancial provisions for the costs associated with mine closures and
reclamation, and is of the opinion that any changes to environmental laws and
regulations in the future should not have a material effect on the Company.” Royal
Oak did refer to the arsenic trioxide problem in its Water License Annual Report for
1998, but made no estimate of ﬁnancial liability on the grounds that studies of various
remediation options were still underway.
In other words, in its public disclosures, investors would ﬁnd no reference to or
estimate of the very large ﬁnancial liability that the stored arsenic trioxide represent
ed, a liability that had been valued at over $120 million in 1993 and subsequently has
been estimated in the $200 million range. Were these estimates disclosed, the true
state of Royal Oak’s balance sheet would have been clear well before its declaration of
bankruptcy in April 1999.
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Boliden Ltd. – Los Frailes Mine, Spain

On April 24 and 25, 1998, a large tailings pond dam failed at Spain’s Los Frailes mine,
owned by the Canadian mining company Boliden Ltd. A slab of soil beneath the dam
20 meters wide slid downhill approximately one meter. The dam cracked and broke
abruptly. Between ﬁve and seven million cubic meters of acidic, metals-laden water
and slurries spilled through the gap. Three rivers were affected, along with 11,000
acres of farmland.8 Damage was also caused in the Doñana National Park, a U.N.
World Heritage Site.
The dam failure prompted a 28 percent decrease in the value of Boliden’s stock on
the Toronto Stock Exchange in the ﬁve days after it was reported.9 The event also
triggered other material consequences. Boliden has spent at least $12 million dollars
cleaning up the Los Frailes spill.10 On October 2, 2000, Boliden announced that its
subsidiary Boliden Apirsa had ﬁled a court application for commencement of
bankruptcy proceedings and that the company would not continue development of
the Los Frailes mine after October 2001.
A class action lawsuit was ﬁled by the Canadian law ﬁrm Klein Lyons on behalf of
Boliden’s shareholders. The lawsuit alleges negligence on Boliden’s part and claims mil
lions of dollars in damages as a result of Boliden’s failure to disclose the risk of the dam
breach.11 Moreover, on November 16, 2002, Boliden was sued for $89.9 million by the
Andalucian regional government. Although this case was dismissed on January 2, 2003,
the regional government is now trying to recover the money through administrative
channels. On August 2, 2002, the Spanish Council of Ministers demanded that Boliden
pay $45 million in penalties for the spill. Boliden refused and this demand is still pend
ing. The Spanish Government has spent over $275 million cleaning up the spill.
The principal cause of the Los Frailes accident has been established as deﬁciencies
in the design and construction of the tailing dam by Boliden’s contractor Dragados y
Construcciones and its associated engineering ﬁrms, Itecsa and Geocisa.12 These deﬁ
ciencies, coupled with the fragility of clay soil and the high pressures of the water on
the clay foundation,13 are said to have triggered the dam failure. Essentially, with the
weight of tailings behind it, a segment of the dam slid downhill on its slick clay base.
The ﬂow of tailings that escaped through the breach caused a rupture of a 50-meter
section of the embankment.
The company knew of these risks. Following complaints in 1995 from the compa
ny’s own engineer and a Spanish environmental group regarding seepage through the
dam and possible instability and a 1996 report from engineering consultants that slid
ing surfaces were forming in the clay underlying the dam, Boliden and the regional
authorities undertook a series of studies of seepage and the dam’s stability, installed
monitors within the dam to detect movement, and strengthened seepage contain
ment works. These steps convinced the authorities to permit Boliden to raise the dam
to accommodate more tailings from Los Frailes, despite the fact that according to a
report by Geocisa, a civil engineering ﬁrm hired by Boliden, deformations of the
inclinometers had been observed in 1997, indicating movement in the dam.
Nothing in Boliden’s annual reports or interim ﬁnancial statements prior to the
dam failure mentions any possibility of structural problems in the Los Frailes tailings
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dam. The company’s Management Discussion & Analysis prior to the event did not
treat the risk of a dam failure as a material uncertainty known to management.
Subsequent to the event, Boliden admitted in a press release dated Feb. 26, 1999 that
the tailings dam was ill-designed and blamed its contractor Dragados y
Construcciones and its associated engineering ﬁrms Itecsa and Geocisa for the fail
ure, claiming that their “incorrect interpretation of the geotechnical properties of the
Margas Azules (Blue Clay) Formation [. . .] facilitated the failure of the tailings
dam.”14 Faced with claims from Spanish authorities for recovery of damages and
restoration costs, Boliden warned of possible adverse ﬁnancial consequences. In
October 2002, Boliden’s Spanish subsidiary Boliden Apirsa sued the construction
company Dragados y Construcciones S.A. for a minimum of 107 million Euros.
Dakota Mining Company – The Gilt Edge Mine, South Dakota, USA

Gilt Edge Inc., the company eventually reorganized as Dakota Mining Company in
Canada, was granted a state mining permit in 1986 for the Gilt Edge Mine, a gold heap
leach project. It ﬁnished mining the original reserves in 1992. Despite existing evi
dence of acidity and the presence of sulﬁde rocks, the original cash bond for recla
mation was based on mining non-acid generating rock and totaled $1.2 million.
During operations waste rock containing enough sulﬁde minerals to generate acid
was mined. Acid drainage from the waste dump was detected in 1993.
On April 19, 1993, in response to the acid problem, the South Dakota Department
of Environment and Natural Resources issued the company a notice that required it
to develop a mitigation plan. On March 16, 1995, the Board of Minerals and
Environment approved the plan. The acid drainage problem raised the 1995 estimat
ed cost of reclamation and reclamation bond to $8.4 million. The company was able
to provide only an additional $1.0 million cash bond, with a $6.2 million demand
note to cover the rest.
In 1996, the state approved the company’s permit to mine an adjacent site in order
to generate cash for the reclamation program. However, part of the new site was on
National Forest land and the Forest Service did not grant approval of the company’s
environmental impact statement, despite two applications. Consequently, the
company stopped contributing to the reclamation fund, which then contained $6.2
million, and in May 1998 informed the state government that it had no money to
maintain the site or operate the water treatment plant to prevent acid drainage.
Instead, it ﬁlled all the mine pits with 130 million gallons of acidic wastes. By then,
estimated reclamation costs had reached $13 million.
Although the governor of South Dakota sued the company to force it to maintain
the site and operate the plant, the company’s credit was exhausted and in July 1999, it
declared bankruptcy. The state had the mine listed as a Superfund site in 1999 and has
already spent $27 million on cleanup, with an estimated $18 million more needed for
completion.
From 1996 through its 1999 bankruptcy ﬁling, Dakota Mining consistently under
estimated its reclamation liabilities at the Gilt Edge mine, even relative to the surety
required by the state of South Dakota, an amount which itself was considerably less
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than the actual reclamation cost. For example, in statements repeated in ﬁlings
throughout 1997, the company stated that “the ultimate amount of the reclamation
obligations to be incurred is uncertain, however the Company estimates these costs
to be $6.9 million at Gilt Edge Mine ….” According to a government ofﬁcial familiar
with this case, although it was faced with the problem for years at Gilt Edge, Dakota
Mining downplayed its potential liabilities from acid mine drainage in order to avoid
scaring off potential investors.15
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Newmont Mining Corporation – The Midnite Mine, Washington State, USA

The Midnite Mine was an open-pit uranium mine on the Spokane Indian reservation
in Washington State. The site contains pits ﬁlled with hundreds of millions of gallons
of contaminated waters, waste rock and tailings. The mine was owned and operated
by Dawn Mining Company, of which Newmont Mining is majority owner. In April
1998, the EPA began an Expanded Site Inspection (ESI) that conﬁrmed the elevated
level of contamination. In February 1999, the EPA proposed that Midnite be added to
the National Priority List as a Superfund site. This proposal carried important ﬁnan
cial implications for Newmont, the parent company, because CERCLA’s provisions
for joint and several liability greatly increased the likelihood that it, as the majority
owner of Dawn Mining, would be held liable for remediation costs at the Midnite
Mine and possibly the entire cost. A Remedial Action/Feasibility Study was begun.
Data collections continued from the fall 1999 to the spring of 2000. On May 11, 2000,
EPA listed the Midnite Mine site on its Superfund National Priorities List.
Newmont has promptly disclosed material events at the Midnite Mine as they have
occurred. As the federal government moved toward listing the Midnite Mine as a
Superfund site, Newmont noted the various phases. In its 1998 10-K report, after EPA
had proposed the site for the National Priorities List on February 16, 1999, the com
pany made the following disclosure: “In early 1999, the EPA proposed that the mine
be included in the National Priorities List under CERCLA. If asserted, the Company
cannot reasonably predict the likelihood or outcome of any future action against
Dawn or the Company arising from this matter.”16 In the following year’s 10-K, the
company mentioned that the RI/FS had begun and moderated its position as to lia
bility: “In mid-2000, the mine was included on NPL and EPA has initiated a RI/FS
under CERCLA to determine environmental conditions and remediation options at
the site. The EPA has asserted that Dawn and the Company are liable . . ..”17
A year later, the company’s annual report further modiﬁes its potential liability at
the Midnite Mine: “The environmental standards that may ultimately be imposed at
this site as a whole remain uncertain and there is a risk that the costs of remediation
may exceed the provision Newmont’s subsidiary has made for such remediation by a
material amount. Whenever a previously unrecognized remediation liability becomes
known or a previously estimated cost is increased, the amount of that liability or
additional cost is expensed and this can materially reduce net income in that
period.”18
However, in subsequent ﬁlings through 2003, the company has maintained that
since remediation requirements at the Midnite have not been ﬁnally decided, it
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cannot estimate its potential liability and intends vigorously to contest claims against
it. Since the EPA had not completed its RI/FS by the end of 2003, even to the extent
of releasing the estimated costs associated with its retained remediation alternatives,
and had not issued a Record of Decision, Newmont could plausibly claim that it
could not estimate its potential liability. However, when the Midnite Mine was put
under CERCLA’s provisions, the company became subject to speciﬁc SEC and FASB
disclosure requirements. Those requirements prohibit the company from deferring
disclosure until a single cost estimate had been established and require it to provide
a range of possible liabilities if such a range could reasonably be estimated. Newmont
had not provided even a range of potential reclamation costs. In late 2003, an asset
management company ﬁled a shareholder resolution with Newmont calling for fuller
disclosure of environmental liabilities.
Teck Cominco – The Red Dog Mine, Alaska, USA

19

Teck Cominco was formed in
2001 through the merger of
the Teck Corporation and
Cominco Ltd., the previous
operator of the mine.

On July 15, 2002, the Kivalina Relocation Planning Committee of the village of
Kivalina, a small traditional Inuit community, notiﬁed Teck Cominco Alaska,
operator of the Red Dog Mine, that they were going to sue the company under the
citizens’ suit provisions of the Clean Water Act for up to $88 million in penalties for
more than 3,000 violations of the Clean Water Act at the mine and the associated port
facility. The suit charges that the mine regularly violated its discharge permits
regarding efﬂuents of cyanide and total dissolved solids and also discharged excessive
quantities of heavy metals. The case was dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff
was not a “person” but the six individual members have ﬁled a new suit making
similar claims.
The Red Dog Mine site is in the western Brooks Range, approximately 600 miles
north of Anchorage and 55 miles inland. It is the largest zinc mine in the world, pro
ducing 1.2 million tons of lead and zinc concentrates annually. These are then trans
ported by road to a port site storage facility. Teck Cominco Alaska, a subsidiary of
Teck Cominco,18 operates the mine under an agreement with Northwest Alaska Native
Association Regional Corporation (NANA), which owns the land where the mine
and port are located.
The Red Dog Mine has a history of water quality problems, which baseline geo
logic and engineering studies done in the 1980s foretold. In July 1997, Cominco Alaska
settled a federal government suit alleging hundreds of violations of the Clean Water
Act through exceeding permitted levels of metals and pH at its wastewater pit. In the
settlement, Cominco paid a $1.7 million ﬁne, upgraded its water treatment plant, and
agreed to spend more than $3 million on long-term ongoing monitoring and ecolog
ical studies. These studies showed that mine efﬂuents had no incremental adverse
impacts on water quality in Red Dog Creek, given that high background contaminant
levels made it already unﬁt for aquatic life.
However, water quality problems continued at the mine. The two year compliance
record available online at EPA’s Ofﬁce of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance
shows that Red Dog Mine was non-compliant with provisions of the Clean Water Act
in all 8 quarterly periods from October 2001 through September 2003.
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Concentrations of total dissolved solids exceeded permitted levels by 1800 percent
in the last quarter of 2001 and cyanide concentrations exceeded permitted levels by
100 percent in 2002. During this period the company operated under a compliance
order under consent, while it negotiated with EPA for a much less stringent permit
level for total dissolved solids and an alternative method for estimating cyanide con
centrations, both of which were granted in 2003.
A June 2001 study for the Alaska Department of Fish and Game Restoration found
that efﬂuents from the Red Dog Mine over the period June 27, 1996 to June 27, 1997
had high concentrations of sulfate ions (1800-1900 mg/l), high concentrations of cal
cium ions (590-665 mg/l), high concentrations of total dissolved solids (2700-2740
mg/l) and that, on balance, the efﬂuent was highly acidic, all at levels that would have
been toxic to salmon and other aquatic organisms, had they existed in the 10-mile
stretch downstream of the mine.
In June 2001, a study for the National Park Service found elevated levels of lead,
zinc and cadmium along the road leading from the mine to the port through a
national park. The company subsequently addressed emissions from the hauling
trucks. In September 2001, the Alaska Community Action on Toxics released
information that monitoring of the port site from 1990 to 1996 had found lead
concentrations in soils as much as 36 times the state of Alaska’s threshold for
remediation requirements and more than twice as high as the threshold for zinc
contamination.
In short, Teck Cominco was aware of its environmental problems at the Red Dog
Mine and its record of permit violations over the decade preceding the suit because
of its mandated monitoring and reporting programs, monitoring by outside bodies,
and records of non-compliance kept by government environmental agencies. It also
knew that operating under a compliance order by consent did not shield it from cit
izen lawsuits under the Clean Water Act.
Teck Cominco took note of the lawsuit in its 2002 Annual Report’s Environment,
Health and Safety Section: “A Committee from the community near the Red Dog
mine brought proceedings against Teck Cominco alleging violations of the Clean
Water Act and the mine’s water discharge permits. The vast majority of the alleged
incidents were permitted through compliance orders issued by the EPA and Teck
Cominco Alaska has worked closely with the regulatory authorities and NANA to
meet the concerns of the community of Kivalina.”
Prior to the time the suit was announced, none of the company’s ﬁlings give any
indication that the pattern of non-compliance extending over a period of years might
create a ﬁnancial risk or exposure. For that matter, the company’s disclosures do not
reveal ongoing non-compliance. Neither the Management Discussion & Analysis nor
the Environmental Matters sections of the company’s reports treat the issue as a risk
or uncertainty known to management. The company holds that the lawsuit was not
a material event, although in the ﬁve day window surrounding its announcement, the
company’s stock price fell by 10 percent.
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Mandatory disclosure is a widely used public policy instrument, employed to protect
the public and to improve the performance of businesses and government in ﬁelds as
diverse as food safety, fuel efﬁciency, management of toxic substances, and sales of
ﬁnancial securities. Disclosure is a policy tool that relies on informed consumer and
public choice rather than on direct regulation. Disclosure increases market efﬁciency
by eliminating informational asymmetries between sellers and potential buyers that
can distort market prices and sometimes deter market transactions altogether.
Publicity provides strong incentives for business and government managers to
improve performance by preventing them from shielding inferior or excessively risky
products and services behind a veil of secrecy.
Improved disclosure will increase the efﬁciency with which ﬁnancial markets
allocate capital. At present, because information is not adequately available about
environmental exposures that may affect future costs, earnings, and capital outlays,
investors have difﬁculty in identifying companies that have better prospects and
lower risks. Several studies of environmentally sensitive industries, such as oil and
gas, pulp and paper, motor vehicles, and electric power have demonstrated that
individual companies within those sectors vary widely in their ﬁnancial exposure to
impending environmental developments, largely because of the companies’ past
business decisions.20
These differences in exposure can lead to competitive advantages and disadvan
tages among companies within an industry and highly material impacts on share
holder value for the most exposed companies. In environmentally sensitive indus
tries, the success with which companies manage their environmental risks can be a
signiﬁcant determinant of their value. Efﬁcient functioning of ﬁnancial markets
depends on the extent to which they can accurately translate companies’ exposures
and competitive positions into assessments of ﬁnancial value and risk, on the basis of
available information.
The effectiveness of mandatory disclosure as a policy instrument has been rein
forced in the last two decades by several ongoing trends. The development of the
internet and of communications technology has dramatically improved the ease and
speed of communication and has lowered its costs. Also, in many industries, more of
a company’s market value now consists of intangible assets, including its brands and
business reputation. Since strategic alliances, supplier networks, complex chains of
ﬁnancial relationships, and other networks have become an increasingly prominent
aspect of the business world, impairment of a ﬁrm’s reputation can be a devastating
loss. Reputational losses can also undermine consumers’ brand loyalty and make it
more difﬁcult for a company to recruit and retain high quality employees.
In the environmental realm, mandatory disclosure programs have been notably
successful. The U.S. EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory has not only informed the public
about potential hazards in their communities, it has also provided a strong stimulus
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to companies generating reportable quantities of toxic substances to reduce their
generation and release.21 Subsequent to the publication of TRI data, prominent
companies such as Dupont and Dow Chemical, among many others, entered into
voluntary commitments to achieve major reductions, largely through pollution
prevention initiatives. Explaining these commitments, CEOs of these companies have
cited the need to protect their ﬁrms’ reputations. It has also been documented that
the companies with the largest reported quantities of toxic materials in the inventory
experienced adverse stock market reactions, adding a ﬁnancial impetus to their
pollution reduction efforts.
In Canada, the National Pollution Release Inventory (NPRI) has had a similar suc
cess, prompting many companies to embark on accelerated pollution prevention and
reduction programs.22 Emissions reporting requirements such as the TRI and NPRI
stimulated managers in some companies to quantify emissions on a plant and company-wide basis for the ﬁrst time. On the principle that “You manage what you meas
ure,” this expanded measurement by itself encouraged better environmental control.
In addition, greater transparency discouraged management from pursuing unduly
risky environmental policies that might save money in the short-run but would
expose the company and the public to excessive potential damages in the longer run.
The requirement that companies disclose to the investment community the
material ﬁnancial implications of their environmental exposures is also increasingly
important. When the Securities and Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934 enshrined
disclosure as the principal means for regulating ﬁnancial markets in the United
States, Justice Brandeis said, “Sunlight is the best disinfectant.” Since then, ﬁnancial
disclosure has become even more powerful, for several reasons. For one, the inﬂuence
of external ﬁnancial markets on management decision-making has become more
pronounced. Within ﬁnancial markets, an ever-larger percentage of assets are
controlled by institutional money managers, who are capable of large, rapid portfolio
shifts in response to new information. Consequently, unpleasant surprises can lead to
massive sell-offs of a company’s securities and rapid declines in their value. This is
particularly true when the surprising information undermines investor conﬁdence in
a company’s management and raises investor uncertainty about possible future
revelations.
For example, the stock of Solutia, a company formed when Monsanto spun off its
chemical division, plunged by almost 60 percent within a few weeks when an article
in the Washington Post revealed that Monsanto had dumped tons of PCBs in
Anniston, Alabama, and had covered up its behavior for decades. The company’s
behavior was deemed to be “outrageous” by an Alabama jury that held the company
liable for negligence, suppression of truth, and nuisance, which opened Solutia to fur
ther lawsuits. In another well-known case, the stock of U.S. Liquids, a Houston waste
management ﬁrm, fell 58 percent in one week when employees revealed to govern
ment authorities that the company had illegally dumped hazardous wastes and falsi
ﬁed records. Consequently, shareholders ﬁled suit against the company for violation
of securities law by issuing false and misleading reports and failing to disclose mate
rial information. Now, U.S. Liquids has itself been liquidated.
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These instances illustrate not only the power of publicity in ﬁnancial markets but
also the temptations into which managers can fall when imprudent or improper
activities can be hidden from public scrutiny. As managers’ compensation is more
closely tied to stock market performance through stock options and performancelinked bonuses and as ﬁnancial analysts focus ever more closely on quarter-by-quar
ter earnings, the temptation to manage earnings through short-sighted strategies has
become more powerful. Although in recent years this has been seen most obviously
in accounting irregularities and ﬁnancial engineering perpetrated by such companies
as Enron and Worldcom, the temptation to pursue shortsighted environmental prac
tices may be no less strong. The Solutia and U.S. Liquids experiences also illustrate the
dramatic damages that can be suffered by companies and investors through lack of
transparency regarding environmental risks and exposures. The recent corporate
scandals have reduced investor conﬁdence in corporate management to a minimum
and, if anything, have increased the potential damages to companies and investors
when hidden information becomes public.
Yet, there is a signiﬁcant unmet need in ﬁnancial markets for greater disclosure of
material environmental information. At present, although some companies release
environmental reports and statements, these are very rarely linked to ﬁnancial reports,
nor are their ﬁnancial implications explained. Financial analysts report difﬁculty in
linking environmental to ﬁnancial information. Consequently, analysts typically place
little weight on environmental factors in evaluating a security’s risks and potential
returns, even in those sectors in which such factors are demonstrably signiﬁcant.23
Despite a general rule in the securities laws of the United States and Canada that
publicly traded companies disclose all ﬁnancially material information in a timely
manner, few companies with signiﬁcant environmental exposures actually provide
such information in their ﬁnancial statements and ﬁlings. A study of thirteen large
companies in the U.S. pulp and paper industry found that, for the most exposed
companies, the most likely estimate of the ﬁnancial impact of important impending
environmental rules was an 8 to 10 percent loss in total shareholder value. Yet only
three of the thirteen companies mentioned those environmental issues at all in their
ﬁnancial statements, and those three did so only in a cursory qualitative fashion.24
Comparable studies in other industries have arrived at similar ﬁndings.25
The lack of material environmental information is especially pronounced in those
sections of ﬁnancial reports intended to disclose business trends and uncertainties
signiﬁcant for the company’s future earnings and ﬁnancial conditions, such as the
Management Discussion & Analysis section. A report recently made public by the
Securities and Exchange Commission on their review of ﬁnancial statements ﬁled by
the Fortune 500 largest U.S. companies stated:
“We found that we issued more comments on the MD&A discussions of the
Fortune 500 companies than any other topic. Item 303 of Regulation S-K
requires . . . [a discussion of] known material events and uncertainties that
would cause reported ﬁnancial information not to be necessarily indicative
of future operating results or of future ﬁnancial conditions . . .. Our
comments addressed situations where companies simply recited ﬁnancial
yale school of forestry & environmental studies

robert repetto

statement information without analysis or presented boilerplate analysis that
did not provide any insight into the companies’ past performance or
business prospects as understood by management.”26
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Such information is crucial for investors because the value of securities depends on
the stream of future returns and their riskiness. In many industries, future returns
and risks are signiﬁcantly affected by environmental exposures. Because these are
inadequately disclosed and analyzed, investors often suffer sudden and signiﬁcant
losses when those risks materialize. Most of these occurrences were the culmination
of environmental exposures and risks that existed beforehand but were not disclosed
and were not understood by investors, who consequently suffered serious losses.
Financial markets are now asserting a growing demand for transparency, in part
because of these experiences. According to a recent Standard and Poor’s
Transparency and Disclosure Study (available at www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/
pdf/products/WhitePaper.pdf),

U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, “Summary by
the Division of Corporate
Finance of Significant Issues
Addressed in the Review of
the Periodic Reports of the
Fortune 500 Companies”,
February 27, 2003; available
at http://www.sec.gov/divi
sions/corpfin/fortune500rep.
htm

“Public companies around the world are increasingly under pressure from
the ongoing ‘corporate governance revolution’ in which large institutional
investors are intensifying the pressure on management to disclose all
material information.”
A corroborating study by the accounting and consulting ﬁrm Ernst and Young
found, after a study of share performance in the 1000 largest global companies, that
poor investor relations was the third most frequent cause of sudden and major drops
in share value. Companies that are lax on disclosure are more vulnerable to share
price volatility than those that provide qualitatively good information. Moreover,
investors have shown that they are willing to pay a premium for companies with
superior disclosure records.27
In the United States and also in Canada, in the wake of corporate scandals, new
requirements have been adopted requiring CEOs and CFOs to certify the accuracy
and completeness of their ﬁnancial statements and MD&As, requiring more inde
pendence of corporate directors from management, requiring corporation lawyers to
take action if accounting or reporting irregularities are discovered and not corrected,
and requiring separation of auditing and advisory functions. In addition, the current
U.S. administration and Congress have markedly increased appropriations of funds
to strengthen the enforcement capabilities of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, which itself has taken steps to tighten disclosure standards.
The demand for more disclosure extends to environmental information. The SEC
review of Fortune 500 company disclosures found speciﬁcally that information on
environmental exposures and liabilities was frequently deﬁcient.
An increasing number of shareholder resolutions are being ﬁled asking manage
ment for disclosure of material environmental information.
●

In Canada, shareholders of Imperial Oil recently submitted a resolution
requiring the company to spell out potential ﬁnancial liabilities associated
with its greenhouse gas emissions and to put in place a plan to reduce
those liabilities.
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●
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Jeffrey Ball, “Global Warming
is a Threat to Health of
Corporations,” Wall Street
Journal, April 16, 2003.
●

In the United States, in 2003, an investor coalition that includes the State
of Connecticut’s [Retirement] Plans and Trust Fund ﬁled resolutions with
ﬁve of the largest U.S. electric power companies requesting that they
disclose to shareholders the economic risks associated with emissions of
carbon dioxide and other air pollutants and the business beneﬁts
associated with reducing those emissions. In an important recent
development, Institutional Shareholder Services, an organization that
advises pension and mutual fund managers on how to vote their proxies,
endorsed these shareholder resolutions.28 This endorsement potentially
adds institutional money managers controlling hundreds of billions of
dollars in assets to those demanding more environmental transparency.
The Carbon Disclosure Project, an even larger initiative backed by thirtyﬁve of the world’s largest institutional investors, has been urging
companies to disclose their greenhouse gas emissions and the risks they
pose to the companies, and the extent of their emission reduction
programs.

Another trend sustaining the demand for more environmental disclosure is the
increasing share of investor assets held in environmentally screened or “socially
responsible” mutual funds and portfolios. Such portfolios now hold at least a trillion
dollars in assets.
Their growth has been stimulated by two factors. First, the replacement of deﬁnedbeneﬁt pension plans with deﬁned-contribution plans, in which beneﬁciaries have
greater control over asset allocation, has led money management ﬁrms to create and
offer screened portfolios or funds as an investment choice. For this reason, among
others, almost all major investment houses now have staff responsible for environ
mental evaluation and research. Second, the demonstration in recent years that
screened portfolios often provide risk-adjusted returns superior or equal to
unscreened benchmarks has encouraged investors to allocate at least a portion of
their assets to the environmentally screened portfolios. Both factors in combination
contribute to the demand for ﬁnancially relevant environmental information.
First-generation screens merely eliminated companies or entire industries that
were deemed socially unacceptable. They are being replaced by research carried out
by such ﬁrms as IRRC, KLD, Innovest, Trucost and Sustainable Asset Management
that seek to understand which companies are likely to provide higher risk-adjusted
returns by virtue of their superior environmental and sustainability practices.
These developments have reinforced ﬁnancial market demand for relevant
environmental information. Such information should be available under existing
general requirements in the securities laws of Canada and the United States that
companies promptly disclose all material information, since some environmental
information is clearly of material ﬁnancial importance. In addition, there are more
detailed and speciﬁc environmental disclosure requirements in U.S. and Canadian
securities regulations that have been clarified through published accounting
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standards and explanatory releases by securities regulators. These detailed disclosure
requirements cover such matters as the costs of compliance with environmental
regulation, liabilities for remediation and restoration of contaminated property,
potential damages from environmentally-related legal actions, and other known
environmental risks and uncertainties.
However, concerns have been raised regarding the extent to which these require
ments are being complied with or enforced, partly as the result of the sector studies
and individual cases mentioned above. Last year the U.S. Senate requested the
General Accounting Ofﬁce to investigate the adequacy of environmental disclosure by
corporations publicly listed on U.S. securities markets, and the adequacy of the SEC’s
enforcement of its own requirements. This request followed the release of a 1998
study by EPA that found that 74 percent of the companies subject to environmental
legal proceedings that should have been disclosed under SEC rules had failed to do
so. In Europe as well, the European Commission issued stricter non-binding guide
lines in 2001 for disclosure of environmental costs and liabilities in response to a ﬁnd
ing that unreliable and inadequate information about environmental performance
“makes it difﬁcult for investors . . . to form a clear and accurate picture of the impact
of environmental factors on a company’s performance or to make comparisons
between companies.”29
In fact, enforcement of environmental disclosure requirements in the past has
been minimal. In Canada, only a single case involving environmental disclosure was
brought by securities regulators within a period of twenty-ﬁve years. In the United
States, only a handful of cases were raised.30 Enforcement has not been vigorous in
years past because environmental issues were not salient among all the securities reg
ulatory issues that the responsible agencies were faced with. Moreover, those agencies
have typically been under-staffed and under-funded to the extent that they were able
to deal with only the most urgent and egregious issues.31
The lack of enforcement effort has weakened compliance with disclosure regula
tions. Further, this has led to the misperception among some ﬁnancial analysts and
investors that, since little environmental information was included in ﬁnancial dis
closures, such information must not have been material.
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why focus on the hardrock mining sector?
These considerations are extremely relevant to the mining industry. According to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, aside from global warming, mining presents
the most signiﬁcant threat to ecosystems around the world. A modern open pit mine
extracts hundreds of millions of tons of earth, rock and ore, disrupting the landscape
and in many instances blocking or contaminating waterways. It processes extracted
ores in the open, using such toxic chemicals as cyanide and sulfuric acid. It exposes
native rock and mineral waste to oxygen and water so that acids and heavy metals
leach into surface and ground water. When mining ceases, remediation and reclama
tion of the pit and surrounding waste can require decades of work and cost hundreds
of millions of dollars.
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Mines throughout the United States and Canada are responsible for major
environmental impacts on land, air and water quality. In the U.S., EPA estimates that
mining has polluted 40 percent of western watersheds, where most mining occurs.
The EPA has also identiﬁed the mining industry as the largest toxic polluter in the
U.S. There are tens of thousands of abandoned mine sites throughout western North
America, many of which are still causing environmental damage.
Mining companies have often understated such impacts in permit applications,
environmental impact assessments, and ﬁnancial prospectuses. This pattern of
performance has had signiﬁcant ﬁnancial consequences. When faced with the costs of
remediation, mining companies have sometimes declared bankruptcy, to the
detriment of creditors and shareholders. Taxpayers have been forced to assume the
clean-up costs of abandoned mining sites. In past years, cases have been brought by
citizens or by securities regulators in the U.S. and Canada alleging inadequate
disclosure of material environmental liabilities. No new paragraph here. Follow on
“In September . . . In September 1998, Local 890 of the United Steelworkers’ Union
brought suit in federal court, alleging that Phelps Dodge had failed over a period of
years to disclose releases of large volumes of toxic materials at its mining operations
in New Mexico. At the close of 2003, the Boston Common Asset Management Group
ﬁled a shareholder resolution with Newmont Mining Corporation calling on the
company to report on the risk to the company’s operations, proﬁtability and
reputation from its social and environmental liabilities. A spokesperson for the
Group stated, “Newmont Mining senior executives purport to be committed to
sustainable development but we continue to have concerns as investors that the
company is not fully disclosing its social and environmental liabilities. We feel that
Newmont needs to disclose not only its potential liabilities but also what policies the
company will put in place to avoid those costs in the future.32 These and other
examples illustrate the need to examine more broadly the disclosure practices in the
mining sector.

what disclosure requirements apply to u.s. and
canadian mining companies?
Essential Features of Applicable Disclosure Requirements in Canada

Securities regulation falls within the responsibilities of the provincial governments
but Ontario’s regulations generally set the standard. The securities disclosure regime
begins with the requirement that a preliminary and ﬁnal prospectus be ﬁled33
containing “full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts relating to the securities
issued or proposed to be distributed.”34 ‘Material fact’ is deﬁned by the Ontario
Securities Commission as “a fact that signiﬁcantly affects, or would reasonably be
expected to have a signiﬁcant effect on, the market price or value of such securities.35
Material changes, deﬁned as “. . . a change in the business, operations or capital of the
issuer that would reasonably be expected to have a signiﬁcant effect on the market
price or value of any of the securities of the issuer,” must also be promptly disclosed.36
Any material change in the affairs of a reporting issuer must be disclosed to securities
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regulators and to the public through a press release by a senior ofﬁcer of the company
that describes the nature and substance of the development.37
The legislation appears to set up separate disclosure requirements for material
facts and changes. However, provincial securities commissions and stock exchanges
have largely eliminated this distinction; instead, there is an obligation to make con
tinuous and timely disclosure of all material information that arises in the affairs of
a reporting issuer, a category including both material facts and changes.38
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Disclosure Requirements of Environmental Information

To the extent that environmental information could reasonably be expected to inﬂu
ence investors’ decisions or securities prices, it must be disclosed under existing reg
ulations. In addition, there are speciﬁc disclosure requirements pertaining to envi
ronmental information.
The prospectus must include a narrative description of the business of the issuer,
including “. . . the ﬁnancial and operational effects of environmental protection
requirements on the capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the
issuer in the current ﬁnancial year and the expected effect, on future years.”39 The
issuer must also list “risk factors material to the issuer that a reasonable investor
would consider relevant to an investment in the securities being distributed,” such as
“environmental and health risks.”
Securities law requires the reporting issuer to set out in its annual information
form the impact of the following environmental criteria on its business generally and
to list for the affected industry segments “. . . the ﬁnancial or operational effect of
environmental protection requirements on the capital expenditures, earnings and
competitive position of the Issuer for the current ﬁscal year and any expected impact
on future years.”40
According to the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, the following gen
eral provisions would also apply:41 Under Part III, Management Discussion &
Analysis, Item 1(4)(a), para. 124, environmental expenses that are unusual or infre
quent events or transactions or otherwise represent any signiﬁcant economic change
materially affecting income from operations must be disclosed, along with the extent
to which the income from operations are affected.
If disclosure of an environmental risk or uncertainty is necessary for an under
standing of the Issuer’s ﬁnancial condition, changes therein, or results of operations,
it should be disclosed under Part III, MD&A, Item 1(1)(3), para.108, with particular
emphasis on risks over the next two years. Recent guidance issued by CICA on
MD&A disclosures emphasizes companies’ obligations to provide management’s
assessment of future value drivers and material trends and uncertainties, giving
investors a realistic portrayal of the business outlook and prospects as seen by man
agement, not simply a boilerplate narrative reiteration of current ﬁnancial data.42
Disclosure requirements for natural resource companies in British Columbia are
particularly relevant for mining companies. Regulations require substantial disclo
sure of the ﬁnancial impact of environmental regulations.43 Concerning proposed
exploration and development programs, they require disclosure where environmen
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tal restrictions are likely to have an effect on operations. They also require environ
mental regulations to be listed again under the heading of “risk factors,” where such
regulation could be a material ﬁnancial risk to an investor. For the mining industry
in particular, regulations in British Columbia require the disclosure, to the extent
known, of all environmental liabilities to which the property is subject and call on the
issuer to include a discussion in the Technical Report of environmental bond posting,
remediation and reclamation obligations, if applicable.
In Canada, companies must present their ﬁnancial statements according to GAAP.
The CICA Handbook is an authoritative source of GAAP, including the proper treat
ment of environmental liabilities. Section 3060 of the Handbook requires that an
accrual for the future removal and site restoration costs be made through charges to
income.” Section 3060 also states that these future environmental liabilities are to be
reported only “when the likelihood of their incidence is established as a result of envi
ronmental law, contract, or because the enterprise has established a policy to restore
a site.” Future expenditures are to be recognized in ﬁnancial statements if the trans
action or event has already occurred. The CICA's position is that past environmental
damage is deﬁnitely a triggering event when there is environmental legislation that
requires a company to undertake remediation.
Environmental Disclosure Requirements in U.S. Securities Regulations
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In addition to extensive specific disclosure requirements set forth largely in
Regulation S-K, the Securities and Exchange Acts lay on companies a far more general
obligation to disclose all material information needed to make required statements
not misleading. This requirement applies to securities registrations, prospectuses,
proxy statements, and periodic reports. Making false or misleading facts or omitting
to disclose a material fact that is needed to make other statements not misleading
opens a company and its ofﬁcers to severe penalties, including criminal prosecution,
civil penalties, withdrawal of registration, and private lawsuits by investors who have
suffered damages. Recently, the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill placed legal requirements on
CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded companies to certify the completeness and
accuracy of their ﬁnancial disclosures and increased the responsibilities of company
directors.
A materiality ﬁlter has been applied to distinguish information that companies
must disclose, including environmental information. Moreover, in response to
National Resources Defense Council’s rulemaking petition, the SEC clariﬁed its posi
tion that, insofar as environmental information is material, its disclosure is required
under securities law and that requirement would be enforced.44
The concept of materiality has been clariﬁed in litigation and interpretive releases.
Material information is information that a reasonable investor would ﬁnd signiﬁcant,
in the total mix of available information. In SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No.99,
devoted to materiality, the Commission reminded companies that no numerical
benchmark could be relied upon as a threshold of materiality. Rather, “a matter is
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it
important.”45 The Bulletin quotes a judgment by the U.S. Supreme Court to the effect
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that a fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that the fact would have been
viewed by a reasonable investor as having signiﬁcantly altered the total mix of infor
mation made available.46 The Bulletin cites examples of misstatements or omissions
that might be material although quantitatively small in ﬁnancial terms. Among these
are mis-statements bearing on the integrity or competence of management, such as a
company’s compliance with environmental regulatory requirements.
The SEC has issued regulations, instructions and interpretative and explanatory
releases that have created an extensive and highly integrated disclosure system. The
disclosure rules are speciﬁed in detail in Regulation S-K.47 These information require
ments have been standardized to a large extent across several important disclosure
stages speciﬁed in the Securities and Exchange Acts. They include:
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1) information contained in a prospectus or similar document when
securities are offered for sale to the public or otherwise distributed;
2) information contained in a statement accompanying the registration
of securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission;
3) information contained in proxy solicitations in conjunction with the
election of ofﬁcers and votes in annual meetings; and,
4) information contained in required annual, quarterly, and special
ongoing reports ﬁled with the SEC and made available to the public.
Some disclosure requirements apply specifically to information of an
environmental nature. However, the SEC has stated that compliance with such
speciﬁc disclosure requirements does not obviate the ﬁrm’s obligation to comply with
more general requirement that all material information must be revealed.48 For
example, if a company makes public disclosure of its environmental policies, it must
ensure that statements made are accurate and sufﬁcient to make the information not
misleading.
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SEC Release No. 33-6130;
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Section 101 c) xii) of Regulation S-K speciﬁes:
“Appropriate disclosure also shall be made as to the material effects that
compliance with Federal, State and local provisions which have been enact
ed or adopted regulating the discharge of materials into the environment, or
otherwise relating to the protection of the environment, may have upon the
capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position of the registrant and
its subsidiaries. The registrant shall disclose any material estimated capital
expenditures for environmental control facilities for the remainder of its
current ﬁscal year and its succeeding ﬁscal year and for such further periods
as the registrant may deem material.”
In an interpretive release, the SEC made it clear that companies may have to make
and disclose estimates of environmental compliance costs in future years if they
expect such costs to be material and signiﬁcantly higher than current costs.49 For
example, most environmental regulations are enacted with a compliance deadline set
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in the future, so that future year capital expenditures might substantially exceed those
expected in the current year.
The distinction between provisions that have been enacted and those that have
been adopted is signiﬁcant in the United States system, because many environmental
regulations that are enacted are not adopted for months or years thereafter because
of legal challenges. Section 101c) xii) requires disclosure of the material effects of reg
ulations enacted but not yet adopted.
In addition, though not targeted exclusively at litigation arising out of environ
mental matters, Section 103 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of pending materi
al legal proceedings:
“Describe briefly any material pending legal proceedings, other than
ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the registrant
or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is the
subject.”
The instructions for Item 103 stipulate that
“. . . No information need be given with respect to any proceeding that
involves primarily a claim for damages if the amount involved, exclusive of
interest and costs, does not exceed 10 percent of the current assets of the
registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis. “. . . Notwithstanding
the foregoing, an administrative or judicial proceeding (including . . .
proceedings which present in large degree the same issues) arising under any
Federal, State or local provisions that have been enacted or adopted
regulating the discharge of materials into the environment or primary for
the purpose of protecting the environment shall not be deemed “ordinary
routine litigation incidental to the business” and shall be described if:
A. Such proceeding is material to the business or ﬁnancial condition of the
registrant;
B. Such proceeding involves primarily a claim for damages, or involves
potential monetary sanctions, capital expenditures, deferred charges or
charges to income and the amount involved, exclusive of interest and
costs, exceeds 10 percent of the current assets of the registrant and its
subsidiaries on a consolidated basis; or
C. A governmental authority is a party to such proceeding and such
proceeding involves potential monetary sanctions, unless the registrant
reasonably believes that such proceeding will result in no monetary
sanctions, or in monetary sanctions, exclusive of interest and costs, of
less than $100,000; provided, however, that such proceedings which are
similar in nature may be grouped and described generically.”
Another disclosure requirement imposed by Regulation S-K with great potential
significance for environmental information is Item 303, which specifies the
requirements for the Management Discussion & Analysis, a narrative explanation
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that accompanies the ﬁnancial reports. Item 303 requires a disclosure and discussion
of any known trends, commitments, events or uncertainties that will have a material
effect on the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial condition or results of operation. The instructions to
Item 303 state inter alia:
“. . . The discussion and analysis shall focus speciﬁcally on material events
and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported
ﬁnancial information not to be necessarily indicative of future operating
results or of future ﬁnancial condition . . ..”
The scope of this requirement was further explained in an interpretive release, which
states that
“A disclosure duty exists where a trend, demand, commitment, event or
uncertainty is both presently known to management and reasonably likely to
have material effects on the registrant’s ﬁnancial condition or results of
operation.”
This release shifts the burden of proof onto management, in that known uncertain
ties must be disclosed unless management can determine that a material effect “is not
reasonably likely to occur.”50 In its explanation of this requirement, the SEC used a
hypothetical proposed government safety regulation affecting a company’s opera
tions as an example. In deciding whether this proposed regulation must be disclosed,
the SEC stated:
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“. . . management must make two assessments:
(1) Is the known trend, demand, commitment, trend or uncertainty likely
to come to fruition? If management determines that it is not reason
ably likely to occur, no disclosure is required.
(2) If management cannot make that determination, it must evaluate
objectively the consequences of the known trend, demand, commit
ment, event, or uncertainty on the assumption that it will come to
fruition. Disclosure is then required unless management determines
that a material effect on the registrant’s condition or results of opera
tions is not reasonably likely to occur.”51
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In this release, the SEC pointed out that events that have already occurred or are
anticipated may give rise to material known uncertainties. It warns registrants that
“Where a material change in the company’s ﬁnancial condition or results of
operations appears in a reporting period and the likelihood of such change
was not discussed in prior reports, the Commission staff, as part of its review
of the current ﬁling, will inquire as to the circumstances existing at the time
of the earlier ﬁlings to determine whether the registrant failed to discuss a
known trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty as required by
Item 303.”52
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In its interpretive discussion of required disclosure in the Management, Discussion &
Analysis section, SEC staff speciﬁcally referred to a company’s obligations when iden
tiﬁed as a Potentially Responsible Party (PRP) to a site contamination under CER
CLA, the “Superfund” law. After a company is so notiﬁed, it may be subsequently sub
ject to the law’s joint and several liability provision for environmental remediation
costs. The interpretive release states that a PRP notiﬁcation does not automatically
require disclosure of an anticipated government proceeding under Item 103 of
Regulation S-K. However, under Item 303, a PRP notiﬁcation does require a MD&A
discussion unless management is able to determine, based on the known facts and
circumstances, that a material ﬁnancial effect is not likely to occur. Such circum
stances might include the company’s contribution to the contamination, its insurance
coverage, and the likely contribution from other responsible parties.
Generally Accepted Accounting Standards

As in Canada, U.S. companies are required to use generally accepted accounting
practices in preparing and presenting financial statements. Section 4-01a of
Regulation S-X rules that statements that do not comply with GAAP are considered
to be misleading. GAAP is deﬁned through authoritative pronouncements by
accounting standards bodies, such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB). These accounting standards have an important bearing on the way
companies disclose and treat environmental information.
Because the Superfund Laws enactment of strict, joint and several liability for
cleanup of badly contaminated sites created such potentially large ﬁnancial liabilities
for many companies, it stimulated considerable attention from the accounting pro
fession to contingent liabilities arising from environmental contamination. The basic
accounting framework for dealing with such contingencies is set forth in the FASB
Financial Accounting Standard No. 5 (“Accounting for Contingencies”) and Financial
Interpretation No. 14 (“Reasonable Estimation of the Amount of a Loss”). Potential
liability for costs of environmental cleanup is classiﬁed as a contingent liability unless
the possibility is remote or the costs insigniﬁcant.
FAS5 sets forth two criteria determining whether a contingent liability must be
accrued. It must be reasonably probable that a loss has occurred, the value of an asset
has been impaired, or a liability has been incurred. Further, the amount of a loss must
be reasonably estimated. However, even if no accrual is necessary, the contingency must
be disclosed if there is a reasonable possibility that a loss has been incurred. In order to
prevent companies from taking refuge in uncertainties surrounding their share in
cleanup costs, FIN14 prescribes that if a probable range of loss can be determined, then
the most likely amount within that range should be accrued. If no amount is more like
ly than any other, however, the low end of the range should be recorded. FASB’s
Financial Interpretation No. 93 (FIN93) further prescribed that contingent liabilities
such as those for environmental remediation should be recorded without netting out
possible ﬁnancial recoveries from insurance companies or other responsible parties,
except under very narrowly deﬁned circumstances. Moreover, FASB’s Emerging Issues
Task Force, in release EITF 93-5, “Accounting for Environmental Liabilities,” prescribed
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
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that such liabilities should not be discounted to their present value unless the amount
and timing of the outlays can be reliably determined.
The SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin 92 to elaborate on these issues of
generally accepted accounting practices for contingent liabilities.53 SAB 92 instructs
registrants that disclosure or accrual should not be delayed because of uncertainty
until only a single amount can be reasonably estimated. Estimates should be based on
available information and updated in later ﬁlings as more information becomes
available. SAB 92 conﬁrms that potential recoveries from third parties should not be
netted against potential liabilities. Rather, the gross amount and the potential
recovery should be recorded separately in the balance sheet. Further, disclosure
should be made of the amounts of potential recovery that are contested by third
parties. If a company does discount an environmental liability, SAB 92 prescribes that
it must disclose its discounting method and rate, which must not exceed the U.S.
Treasury bill rate. SAB 92 also articulates the disclosure required in notes to the
ﬁnancial statement to make them not misleading, if no amount is accrued. The
company should disclose the circumstances surrounding the contingency, the range
of possible outcomes and the company’s judgments and assumptions regarding those
outcomes. In general, consistent with Regulation S-K, Item 303, the SEC requires that
disclosure should be sufﬁcient to enable investors to understand the range of
outcomes that could have a material effect on the company’s liquidity, ﬁnancial
condition and results of operation.

the approach used in this review of mining company
disclosure practices
This study is an exploratory investigation of the extent to which the disclosures of
material environmental information by mining companies in the United States and
Canada have in recent years followed the rules and guidelines summarized above. The
methodology of the study consists of the following steps:
First, a number of events were identiﬁed that met the following criteria: 1) they
happened to publicly-traded mining companies listed on U.S. or Canadian stock
markets; 2) the events had material ﬁnancial signiﬁcance for those companies and
their investors or creditors; 3) the events were related to the companies’ environmen
tal exposures, performances, obligations, or liabilities; and 4) the events occurred,
with few exceptions, in the relatively recent past – mostly within the last ﬁve years.
The screen of ﬁnancial materiality that was used in identifying such events was
straightforward. Material events included those involving bankruptcies; abrupt and
large percentage movements in the company’s stock price; denials in operating
permits to exploit important properties; or increases in ﬁnancial liabilities and
obligations that were signiﬁcant in the context of the company’s overall balance sheet.
The ﬁnancial magnitude of the events selected for investigation left little doubt of
their materiality.
Second, the ﬁnancial ﬁlings and press releases that the company involved in each
event made at the time of the event, during subsequent periods and during periods
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preceding the event were examined in order to learn what the company had disclosed
about each of the events selected for investigation. For U.S. companies, this involved
reviewing 10-K, 10-Q and 8-K forms. For Canadian companies, it involved reviewing
annual information forms, MD&As, press releases and other periodic and special
disclosures.
Third, the background and context of each event was investigated in an effort to
learn what the company involved knew or was in a position to know about the event
when and after it happened, and what it was in a position to know about the possi
bility or likelihood of the event before it occurred. This was the most difﬁcult aspect
of the exploration because it was carried out with no access to internal company doc
uments or other material. This phase was carried out by examining reports, studies
and other material prepared by government agencies, consultants or other experts
that would have been available to the company and other parties at speciﬁc times.
The purpose of this phase of the investigation was to explore whether the require
ments of the Management Discussion & Analysis section of the ﬁnancial reports of
publicly traded companies – that uncertainties known to management that would
cause future ﬁnancial conditions and results to be materially different from those
reported be disclosed – were being fulﬁlled. This focus on MD&A reporting was
motivated by recent reports by securities regulators or accounting standards bodies
in both the United States and Canada that fulﬁllment of MD&A reporting obligations
has generally been unsatisfactory, as well as by the intrinsic importance for investors
of insight into material forward-looking information.
In summary, this exploratory investigation is an effort to pursue the line of inquiry
to which the SEC long ago committed itself but apparently has not pursued:
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“Where a material change in the company’s ﬁnancial condition or results of
operations appears in a reporting period and the likelihood of such change was
not discussed in prior reports, the Commission staff, as part of its review of the
current ﬁling, will inquire as to the circumstances existing at the time of the
earlier ﬁlings to determine whether the registrant failed to discuss a known
trend, demand, commitment, event or uncertainty as required by Item 303.”54

case studies
Canyon Resources – Kendall Mine
The Event

The Kendall gold mine in Lewiston, Montana is owned and operated by Canyon
Resources, Inc. A reclamation performance bond amounting to $1.86 million had
been provided by the company in1989. In October, 1999, the Montana Department of
Environmental Quality, on the basis of a review of the costs of clean-up and remedi
ation of the cyanide leach pad and other mine works, determined that the bond must
be increased to $8.3 million. This increase of $6.44 million represented a material
amount for the company relative to its total and current assets of $81.8 and $13.6 mil
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lion at the end of 1998. On August 21, 2000, the Montana DEQ further raised the
required bond amount to $14.2 million.
The Company’s Disclosures

In the company’s third quarter 10-Q ﬁling, dated September 30, 1999, it promptly
disclosed the increased bond amount, stating that the company “had received a
determination notice from the Department of Environmental Quality for an increase
in the Kendall Mine reclamation bond from approximately $1.9 million to
approximately $8.1 million. Although the company believes the increased bond
amount greatly exceeds the costs of remaining work to be accomplished, it is unsure
what remedies, if any, the DEQ may seek if the parties cannot agree on the
appropriate bond amount.”55
Moreover, next year, in its third quarter 10-Q ﬁling for September 30, 2000, the
company disclosed that “In August, 2000, the DEQ further revised the bond amount
to approximately $14.2 million. The company believes the DEQ bond amount exceeds
the cost of remaining work and has ﬁled an administrative appeal to the DEQ’s
actions.”56 Therefore, Canyon Resources discharged its obligation to promptly
disclose this material information. Furthermore, in subsequent disclosure extending
from 2000 through the third quarter of 2003, the company discussed its ongoing
controversy with the state of Montana regarding reclamation at the Kendall Mine,
including the information that in February, 2002 the DEQ had issued a decision that
a comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement would be required to guide the
remaining reclamation, a decision that the company maintained would unnecessarily
delay work and increase costs.
Prior to October 1999, Canyon Resources was aware that the adequacy of its
reclamation bond was under review by the Montana Department of Environmental
Quality. The Montana Mine Reclamation Act stipulates that the department must carry
out an overview of the bond amount annually and a comprehensive bond review at
least every ﬁve years. It also provides that the department shall consult with the licensee
or permittee if the review indicates that the bond should be adjusted. The DEQ notiﬁes
the company when such a review is undertaken and makes use of data and information
provided by the company.57 Therefore, the possibility that the required reclamation
bond might be raised by a material amount was an uncertainty known to management
prior to the event and was required to be disclosed under Item 303(d).
The company did disclose this material uncertainty in its 1998 annual 10-K ﬁling,
dated April 7, 1999. The company’s MD&A stated that
“The Kendall Mine operates under permits granted by the DEQ. The DEQ
requires the Company to maintain a $1,869,000 Reclamation Bond to ensure
appropriate reclamation. The DEQ is currently reviewing the adequacy of
the bond amount and the Company anticipates that the DEQ will require a
bond increase, but cannot presently predict the amount of any such increase.
Additionally, although the DEQ has approved the Company’s plans related
to recontouring, revegetation, drainage and dewatering, discussions of long
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term water handling and heap closure methods continue. The Company’s
estimate to achieve ﬁnal mine closure may be impacted by the outcome of
these pending matters.”58
In view of the disagreement between the company and the DEQ regarding the
additional reclamation required, it is plausible that the company at that time was
unable to predict accurately the outcome of the review. However, Item 303(d) requires
reports to include a range of estimates, when such a range can be reasonably
estimated.
In conclusion, in the case of this event, the company, Canyon Resources, did
promptly disclose material information, as required, and also provided the required
warning regarding a material uncertainty known to management though it did not
reveal the possible ﬁnancial range of that uncertainty.
Hecla Mining Company – Bunker Hill/ Coeur d’Alene Mining Superfund Site
Background

Mining in the Coeur d’Alene basin in Idaho dates from the 1880s. Many companies
extracted ores of lead, zinc and other metals from the region for more than a century.
The Bunker Hill lead smelter there began operations in 1917, when few, if any,
environmental restrictions were in place. It released hundreds of pounds of lead and
other heavy metals into the atmosphere daily for years. Tailings discharged into the
river dispersed onto the ﬂoodplain. A ﬁre in 1973 crippled air pollution control
capacity and markedly increased emissions. In 1977 tall stacks were constructed,
which dispersed atmospheric deposition over a much wider area. The smelting
operation was shut down in 1982 and in 1983 a 21 square mile area (“the Box”) was put
onto the Superfund National Priorities List because of the high levels of lead, arsenic,
cadmium and other toxic residues in soils and evidence of extremely elevated levels
of lead in children’s blood samples. Remediation in the residential areas of the site
(“Operable Unit 1”) began in 1989 and included excavating and replacing
contaminated soil. Wider remedial action elsewhere in the Box (“Operable Unit 2”)
began on the basis of an EPA Record of Decision in 1992. In August 1994 a consent
decree was ﬁled involving Hecla and other major surviving mining companies calling
for cleanup of residential areas at a cost of about $44 million. This work, mostly
performed by the EPA and the State of Idaho, continued throughout the 1990s and
beyond at a cost estimated by the General Accounting Ofﬁce in March 2001 of $212
million.
A much larger area in the Coeur d’Alene valley and beyond was polluted both by
atmospheric deposition and by mine efﬂuents discharged into the Coeur d’Alene
River, released from holding ponds or washed from mines, tailings and mine wastes.
The area affected suffered damages to ﬁsh and wildlife as well as to the human pop
ulation, including those on tribal reservation lands. Efforts to deal with this wide
spread contamination during the early 1990s had had limited effect.
In February 1998, after consultations with mining companies and state ofﬁcials,
EPA made a controversial announcement of the decision to carry out a Remediation
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Investigation/Feasibility Study under CERCLA, a step leading toward Superfund
remediation action for the broader area. In June 2000 a federal court decision con
ﬁrmed that the broader area outside the Box was included in the National Priority
List deﬁnition of the Bunker Hill facility. The remedial investigation carried out by
the EPA included extensive consultations and negotiations with local communities
and governments, mining companies, and state ofﬁcials. The draft RI was released for
public comment in July 2000 and ﬁnalized in July 2001. The various remediation
options described in the study ranged in cost from $194 million in present value, the
mining companies’ preferred option, to $2.6 billion, the maximum option. On
September 12, 2002, after months of public comment and discussion, the EPA released
its Record of Decision for the much larger area outside the Box (“Operable Unit 3”)
to deal with contaminated soils and water. The total estimated discounted present
cost of the actions identiﬁed in this ROD was approximately $360 million. This cost
estimate was additional to the amounts of money spent and remaining to be spent on
remediation within the 21-square mile Box area.
In March 1996, the U.S. Department of Justice ﬁled suit on behalf of the EPA and
other federal agencies, alleging that Hecla and other mining companies were liable for
the payment of response costs and natural resource damages resulting from the
release of hazardous materials. This suit was consolidated with an earlier suit brought
in 1991 by the Coeur d’Alene Tribe for recovery of natural resource damages. EPA
sued to recover costs spent by the federal government on removal and remediation of
hazardous materials. Other plaintiffs sued for recovery of natural resource damages.
The suit ﬁnally came to a partial decision on September 3, 2003. The district court
ruled that Hecla was liable for 31% of the damages and response costs. The second
phase of the trial will settle the extent of damages and liabilities. It will go to trial in
2004 and a decision is expected in 2005.
The Events

Within this history, two events stand out as particularly signiﬁcant. The ﬁrst is the
EPA’s announcement in September 2002 of its Record of Decision for remedial action
in Operating Unit 3, the larger Coeur d’Alene Basin, with an estimated discounted
present cost of approximately $360 million. The second is the decision of the federal
court in September 2003 assigning a 31 percent liability to Hecla for the costs of reme
dial actions and natural resource damages. Both followed well after the consent
decree of 1994 in which Hecla assumed partial responsibility for remedial actions
within Operating Units 1 and 2. Because of the lengthy processes preceding these ﬁnd
ings, both decisions represented material uncertainties known to the company well
prior to the dates of announcements.
Hecla’s Disclosures

During this lengthy process Hecla disclosed each of the events described above and
other related events as they occurred, mostly in the Financial Contingencies segment
of its annual and quarterly reports. It also disclosed its remedial spending on the
Bunker Hill and other sites and the liabilities it had accrued for future work at Bunker
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Hill and other sites. Despite the availability of EPA’s draft RI/FS documents and their
range of cost estimates, it did not discuss its possible liabilities in the wider basin. For
example, the following language from the 10-Q issued in May 14, 2001, well after the
draft feasibility study estimates became available, states:
“Hecla has not accrued any amounts for potential liability associated with
the Coeur d’Alene River Basin environmental claims as the amount, if any, is
currently not estimable. It is reasonably possible that Hecla’s obligation may
change in the near or longer term. An adverse ruling against Hecla on liabil
ity and damages in this matter could have a material adverse effect on the
Company.” (10-Q, 5/14/01)
However, on August 20, 2001, Hecla made use of the 8-K disclosure form to
announce the conclusion of its Agreement in Principle with the government on
August 16, 2001 with respect to those liabilities and elaborated in its next quarterly
report on August 20th.
“On August 16, 2001, the Company entered into an Agreement in Principle
with the United States and the State of Idaho to settle the governments’
claims for natural resource damages and cleanup costs related to the historic
mining practices in the Coeur d’Alene Basin in northern Idaho. The settle
ment, if and when ﬁnalized in the form of a Consent Decree, would release
the Company from further liability to the governments for its historic min
ing practices in the Coeur d’Alene Basin. The Agreement in Principle caps
for a period of ten years the majority of the cleanup related expenditures the
Company is responsible for annually at the Bunker Hill Superfund Site, the
Grouse Creek Mine and the Stibnite site in central Idaho. The Agreement
limits these payments to the Government and/or cleanup obligations at these
sites to a ﬁxed annual cap of $5.0 million for each of the ﬁrst two years of the
Agreement and $6.0 million for each of the next eight years. Hecla is com
mitted to work and/or make payments of $4.0 million annually for the fol
lowing 20 years thereafter. In addition, Hecla would either have to pay or per
form clean up obligations amounting to 10% of its operating cash ﬂow as
adjusted for certain exploration expenditures. Hecla would provide a securi
ty interest in assets with a value of $20 million, which will decline over ten
years. The Agreement in Principle does not include the Coeur d’Alene Indian
Tribe; however, the Company hopes to be able to include the Tribe as a party
to the settlement under the terms of a ﬁnal consent decree. Representatives
of the United States, the State of Idaho and the Company continue to work
on terms of a deﬁnitive consent decree incorporating the terms of the
Agreement in Principle. However, there are a number of signiﬁcant issues,
which will need to be resolved prior to ﬁnalizing the deﬁnitive Consent
Decree. As of March 31, 2002, the Company has accrued $42.7 million relat
ed to the properties covered by the Agreement in Principle. The range of lia
bility for these sites could be up to $138.0 million on an undiscounted basis
plus the percentage of operating cash ﬂow.”
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A year later, in August 2002, the company announced its intention to withdraw
from the Agreement in Principle, as follows:
“Since August 2001, the Company and EPA have continued to negotiate a
ﬁnal consent decree based upon the terms set forth in the Agreement in
Principle. Due to a number of changes that have occurred since the signing
of the Agreement in Principle, including improvements in the environ
mental conditions at Grouse Creek and lower estimated cleanup costs in the
Coeur d’Alene Basin as well as the Company’s improved ﬁnancial condition,
the terms of the multiple properties settlement approach set forth in the
Agreement in Principle appear no longer favorable to the Company. It is
expected that utilizing the Agreement in Principle as a settlement vehicle will
likely be discontinued. However, Hecla continues to negotiate the terms of a
settlement with the United States and the State of Idaho that would be
limited to resolving its environmental cleanup liabilities for historic mining
practices in the Coeur d’Alene Basin.”
In its next quarterly report, issued in November, 2002, Hecla did disclose the EPA’s
Record of Decision with its estimated discounted present cost of $359 million, and the
ongoing trial of Hecla’s liability for those costs and natural resource damages. Its con
clusion, however, was as follows:
“Due to a number of uncertainties related to this matter, including the out
come of pending litigation and the result of any settlement negotiations, the
Company does not have the ability to estimate what, if any, liability exists
related to the Coeur d’Alene River Basin at this time. It is reasonably possi
ble the Company’s ability to estimate what, if any, obligation relating to the
Coeur d’Alene Basin may change in the near or long term depending on a
number of factors. In addition, an adverse ruling against the Company for
liability and damages in this matter could have a material adverse effect on
Hecla.”
When the district court issued its ruling that Hecla’s liability for contamination of
the Coeur d’Alene Basin amounted to 31 percent of damages and response costs,
Hecla disclosed this event in its next quarterly report, on November 14, 2003:
“On September 3, 2003, the Court issued its Phase I ruling, holding that we
have some liability for Coeur d’Alene Basin environmental conditions. The
Court refused to hold the defendants jointly and severally liable for historic
tailings releases and instead allocated a 31% share of liability to us for these
releases. The natural resource damages to which this 31% applies and the
Court’s determination of an appropriate cleanup plan will be addressed in
the Phase II trial. The Court also found that while certain Basin natural
resources had been injured, the Court stated that ‘there has been an exagger
ated overstatement’ by the plaintiffs of Basin environmental conditions and
the mining impact. The Court also signiﬁcantly limited the scope of the
trustee plaintiffs’ resource trusteeship and will require proof in the Phase II

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

35

36

silence is golden, leaden, and copper

trial of the trustees’ percentage of trusteeship in co-managed resources. The
Court also left for the Phase II trial issues on the deference, if any, to be
afforded the government’s cleanup plan and on defendants’ constitutional
due process/retroactivity defense. The Phase II trial is scheduled to com
mence on January 18, 2005. . . . Although the U.S. Government has previous
ly issued its Record of Decision proposing a cleanup plan totaling approxi
mately $359 million, based upon the Court’s prior orders, including its
September 3, 2003 order and other factors and issues to be addressed by the
Court in the Phase II trial, we estimated the range of our potential liability
in the Basin to be $18.0 million to $58.0 million, with no amount in the range
being more likely than any other number at this time. Based upon generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP), we accrued the minimum liability
within the range. As of September 30, 2003, we have estimated and accrued
a potential liability for claims in the Coeur d’Alene Basin litigation of $18.0
million. It is reasonably possible that our ability to estimate what, if any, lia
bility we may have relating to the Coeur d’Alene Basin may change in the
future depending on a number of factors, including the outcome of the
Phase II trial.”
Disclosure Issues

Although Hecla has disclosed material events related to the Coeur d’Alene/Bunker
Hill Superfund site promptly as they have occurred and has warned investors that
these events may have material adverse effects on the company, as the excerpts from
their ﬁnancial ﬁlings quoted above indicate, three disclosure issues related to these
events appear to be signiﬁcant.
First, in the light of the court’s assignment of a 31 percent liability to Hecla, the
EPA’s Record of Decision with respect to clean-up costs in the wider basin (Operating
Unit 3) and the estimated costs of cleaning up the Bunker Hill “Box” (Operating
Units 1 and 2), it does not seem plausible that a potential liability to the company of
$18 million is as likely as any other ﬁgure, or that the range of $18 to $58 million cap
tures the company’s potential liability. The following considerations lead toward a
signiﬁcantly higher range of outcomes. Taken in combination, they raise a serious
question whether the company has accurately estimated its liability.
●

●

Within Operating Units 1 and 2, the total expenditures for response and
remediation have been estimated to total in the vicinity of $212 million,
according to a study by the General Accounting Ofﬁce. The larger part of
those costs was borne by state and federal agencies and is included in the
amounts the government seeks to recover in part from Hecla. Moreover,
since most of those expenditures were made prior to September 2003, they
cannot be discounted into present value terms in estimating a liability.
The EPA’s Record of Decision estimated a cost for the preferred remedia
tion option in Operating Unit 3 of $359 million in present costs. This
option was chosen from a range with associated discounted present costs
of $194 to $2,600 million. Thirty-one percent of the ROD costs amounts
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to $111 million. Since those costs are already expressed in present value
terms, it would be inappropriate to discount them again. Though the
company has questioned the plan adopted in the record of decision, it per
haps should have afforded some weight to the government’s decision.
●

Although the trial judge remarked that in his view the claims for natural
resource damages had been exaggerated by the plaintiffs, which include
various federal agencies as well as the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the alleged
damages were in excess of a billion dollars, based on contamination of
human, ﬁsh, and wildlife habitat in a 1,500 square mile area over a period
extending decades into the past and decades into the future. It is question
able whether the most likely outcome is that the damages will be found to
be negligible.

Second, according to current regulations, a company is required to explain the
assumptions underlying its estimates of liability. Hecla has not done this with respect
to the liability it has accrued for the Coeur d’Alene site.
Third, over the period from the time that the government decided to initiate a
Remediation Investigation/Feasibility Study for the Coeur d’Alene basin in 1998 to
the court’s assignment of substantial liability to Hecla, the sequence of events indi
cated the company’s increasing ﬁnancial exposure to the problems in the basin. These
events included a court’s afﬁrmation that the wider basin could be included in the
CERCLA action, the release of the EPA’s draft RI/FS report with its range of costs, the
Record of Decision indicating a discounted present cost of $360 million for the pre
ferred option, and ﬁnally the decision of the ﬁrst phase of the trial for recovery of
damages and response costs. As seen through the eyes of management, this increas
ing ﬁnancial risk to the company must have been obvious, given the efforts that man
agement made through negotiation, legal and political actions to limit the company’s
exposure. Nonetheless, the Management Discussion & Analysis sections of ﬁnancial
reports over this period, intended to provide investors with an understanding of the
risks, prospects, and uncertainties facing the company as seen by management, pro
vide little such guidance, beyond the indication that unfavorable outcomes could
have material adverse consequences.
For example, after the announcement of EPA’s Record of Decision in September
2002, the MD&A for the next quarterly report, after repeating information regarding
the abrogation of the Agreement in Principle with the government, went on to say lit
tle of any value to investors:
“Due to a number of uncertainties related to this matter, including the out
come of pending litigation and the result of any settlement negotiations, the
Company does not have the ability to estimate what, if any liability exists
related to the Coeur d’Alene River Basin at this time. It is reasonably possi
ble [that] the Company’s ability to estimate what, if any, obligation relating
to the Coeur d’Alene Basin may change in the near or long term depending
on a number of factors. In addition, an adverse ruling against the Company
for liability and damages in this matter could have a material adverse effect
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on Hecla. (For additional information, see Note 5 of the Notes to
Consolidated Financial Statements). Reserves for closure costs, reclamation
and environmental matters [at all sites] totaled $50.7 million at September
30, 2002. Hecla anticipates that expenditures relating to these reserves will be
made over the next several years. Although Hecla believes the reserve is ade
quate based on current estimates of aggregate costs, Hecla periodically
reassesses its environmental and reclamation obligations as new information
is developed. Depending on the results of the reassessment, it is reasonably
possible that Hecla’s estimate of its obligations may change in the near or
long term.”
After the court decision ﬁnding Hecla’s liability to be 31 percent of the total was
announced, the MD&A in the next quarterly report was similarly uninformative and
not fully consistent with the current status of the issue, since the EPA had already
issued a Record of Decision and Hecla’s liability had already been established.
“On January 1, 2003, we adopted SFAS No. 143 ‘Accounting for Asset
Retirement Obligations’ . . . At our non-operating properties, we accrue costs
associated with environmental remediation obligations when it is probable
that such costs will be incurred and they are reasonably estimable. Accruals
for estimated losses from environmental remediation obligations have
historically been recognized no later than completion of the remedial
feasibility study for such facility and are charged to provision for closed
operation and environmental matters. We periodically review our accrued
liabilities for remediation costs as evidence becomes available indicating that
our remediation liabilities have potentially changed. Such costs are based on
management’s current estimate of amounts expected to be incurred when
the remediation work is performed within current laws and regulations.
Recoveries of environmental remediation costs from other parties are
recorded as assets when their receipt is deemed probable. Future closure,
reclamation and environment-related expenditures are difﬁcult to estimate
in many circumstances due to the early stages of investigation, uncertainties
associated with defining the nature and extent of environmental
contamination, the uncertainties relating to specific reclamation and
remediation methods and costs, application and changing of environmental
laws, regulations and interpretations by regulatory authorities and the
possible participation of other potentially responsible parties. Reserves for
closure costs, reclamation and environmental matters totaled $70.3 million
at September 30, 2003. We anticipate that expenditures relating to these
reserves will be made over the next thirty years. It is reasonably possible that
the ultimate cost of remediation could change in the future and that changes
to these estimates could have a material effect on future operating results as
new information becomes known.”
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Teck Cominco – Red Dog Mine
The Event

On July 15, 2002, the Kivalina Relocation Planning Committee of the village of
Kivalina, a small traditional Inuit community living in a remote coastal area of
Alaska, notiﬁed Teck Cominco Alaska, operator of the Red Dog mine, of their
intention to sue the company under the citizen's suit provisions of the Clean Water
Act for up to $88 million in penalties for more than 3,000 violations of the Clean
Water Act at the mine and the associated port facility. The suit charges that the mine
regularly violates its discharge permits with respect to efﬂuents of cyanide and total
dissolved solids and also discharges excessive quantities of heavy metals. The case was
dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiff, not being a “person” or “citizen” under
the Act’s provisions, lacked standing to sue, but six individual members of the KRPC
have ﬁled a new suit making similar claims. These individuals are being represented
in their suit by the Center on Race, Poverty and the Environment, a non
governmental organization in San Francisco.
The Background

The Red Dog Mine is located in the DeLong Mountains of the western Brooks Range,
approximately 600 miles north of Anchorage and 55 miles inland from the Chuckchi
Sea. It is the largest zinc mine in the world, producing 1.2 million tons of lead and zinc
concentrate annually. Lead and zinc are mined and then transported over the DeLong
Mountain Transportation System (DMTS) (the haul road’s ofﬁcial name), to a port site
storage facility. The metals are transported year-round, but are stored most of the year
while the Chuckchi Sea is choked with ice. The mine and the port facility are located
on land owned by the Northwest Alaska Native Association Regional Corporation
(NANA) and are operated by Teck Cominco Alaska, a subsidiary of Teck Cominco (a
Canadian mining company). The Alaska Industrial Development and Export
Authority (AIDEA) owns the DMTS. Teck Cominco was formed in 2001 through the
merger of the Teck Corporation and Cominco Ltd., the previous operator of the mine.
The Red Dog Mine has a history of water quality problems, of which Teck
Cominco has been well aware. Baseline geologic and engineering studies were done
in the 1980s that indicated that the mine’s geology would make it susceptible to acid
mine wastes and drainage. In July 1997, Cominco Alaska settled a federal government
suit alleging that it had repeatedly violated the Clean Water Act by discharging exces
sive levels of metals and acidity from its wastewater pit and had over a thousand vio
lations from 1990 to 1993 at its sanitary sewage facility at the port. In the settlement,
Cominco paid a $1.7 million ﬁne and agreed to spend more than $3 million on long
term ongoing monitoring and ecological studies. The company also upgraded its
water treatment process to deal with zinc and cadmium in the efﬂuents. Ecological
studies found that the Red Dog Creek immediately downstream of the mine had
background concentrations of metals sufﬁciently high that the water was unﬁt for
aquatic life, against which background the mine had no additional adverse impacts
on aquatic communities.

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

39

40

silence is golden, leaden, and copper

However, water quality problems and other environmental problems continued at
the mine. The two year compliance record available online at EPA’s Ofﬁce of
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance shows that Red Dog Mine was non-compli
ant with provisions of the Clean Water Act in all eight quarterly periods from October
2001 through September 2003. During this period, concentrations of total dissolved
solids exceeded permitted levels by 1800 percent in the last quarter of 2001 and
cyanide concentrations exceeded permitted levels by 100 percent in 2002. In com
ments on a draft of this case study, the company pointed out that over the period 1998
to 2003 it was in negotiations with the EPA and the Alaskan government over estab
lishing a standard for total dissolved solids for the mine three times less stringent than
the one in force and operated under consent orders until 2003, when this higher limit
of 1500 ug/L was put into place. The company also pointed out that over the same
period it was negotiating with EPA and Alaska about the appropriate way of measur
ing harmful cyanide in the efﬂuent, eventually gaining acceptance of a different
method that showed cyanide concentrations meeting permitted levels.
Within this period, in another study written in June 2001 for the Alaska
Department of Fish and Game Restoration, it was reported that efﬂuents from the
Red Dog Mine over the period June 27, 1996 to June 27, 1997 had high concentrations
of sulfate ions (1800-1900 mg/l) as well as high concentrations of calcium ions (590
665 mg/l) and high concentrations of total dissolved solids (2700-2740 mg/l) and that
on balance the efﬂuent was highly acidic. Based on a scientiﬁc literature review, the
report stated that toxicity to aquatic organisms depends primarily on ionic proper
ties and that TDS concentrations in excess of 750 mg/l signiﬁcantly reduces fertiliza
tion and hatching in coho and chum salmon. Red Dog’s efﬂuents at the outfall had
concentrations more than three times as high as that threshold. The company stated
that it relied on dilution to reduce concentrations to non-toxic levels downstream at
the point at which salmon could begin spawning.
Other EPA records also indicate continuing environmental problems. When the
mining industry began reporting under the Toxic Release Inventory in 1998, the Red
Dog Mine had the ﬁfth largest toxic releases of all reporting mines. Although the
company asserts that reportable TRI “releases” consisted of controlled mining wastes
containing naturally occurring minerals, TRI records show that for the period 1998
through 2001 releases of reportable toxic substances to air and water, as well as to
land, all showed rising trends.
In June 2001 a study carried out for the National Park Service found elevated lev
els of lead, zinc and cadmium along the road leading from the mine to the port
through a national park. Shortly thereafter, in September 2001, the Alaska
Community Action on Toxics released information that monitoring of the port site
from 1990 to 1996 had found lead concentrations in soils as much as 36 times the State
of Alaska’s threshold for remediation requirements and more than twice as high as
the threshold for zinc contamination. The company’s comments state that it has
taken steps to improve those problem areas.
In short, Teck Cominco was well aware of its environmental problems at the Red
Dog Mine and its history of record of permit violations over the decade preceding the
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suit, because of its mandated monitoring and reporting programs, monitoring by
outside bodies, and notices of non-compliance by government environmental agen
cies. It knew that the fact that it was operating under a compliance order did not
shield it from citizens' suits alleging damages from violations of standards then in
force.
Disclosures

When the lawsuit was announced, Teck Cominco took note of it in its 2002 Annual
Report’s Environment, Health and Safety Section:
“A Committee from the community near the Red Dog mine brought pro
ceedings against Teck Cominco alleging violations of the Clean Water Act
and the mine’s water discharge permits. The vast majority of the alleged inci
dents were permitted through compliance orders issued by the EPA and Teck
Cominco Alaska has worked closely with the regulatory authorities and
NANA to meet the concerns of the community of Kivalina.”
Prior to the time that the suit was announced, none of the company’s ﬁlings give
any indication that the water quality or other environmental problems at the Red Dog
Mine, extending over a period of years, might create a ﬁnancial risk or exposure.
Neither the Management Discussion & Analysis nor the Environmental Matters
sections of the company’s reports treat the issue as a risk or uncertainty known to
management. The Description of Business section of the company’s 2002 Annual
Information Form stated
“All contaminated water from the mine area and waste dumps is collected and
contained in a tailings impoundment and seasonally discharged through a
water treatment plant. Mill process water is reclaimed from the tailings pond.
The mine and associated port facility operate under efﬂuent permits issued by
the EPA and air permits issued by the state of Alaska. The operation is in
material compliance with all of its permits or related regulatory instruments
and has obtained all the permits that are material to its operations.”
This statement seems to be inconsistent with the information published by EPA’s
Ofﬁce of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, which stated that Red Dog was
not in compliance with the Clean Water Act throughout 2002 and early 2003 and was
guilty of signiﬁcant non-compliance with the Act’s regulations in the last quarter of
2001. The company’s explanation is that it was operating under Compliance Orders
under Consent during this period. A Compliance Order under Consent is an admin
istrative order issued by the regulatory agency to a permittee stating what the latter
must do to correct a violation, to which actions the permittee has consented.
The company’s reports during 2001 and 2002 emphasized the company’s environ
mental awareness and progress. The 2001 AIF states: “At the date hereof, none of the
company’s operations are the subject of litigation or administrative proceedings
relating to environmental matters that could materially affect the business of the
company.”
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There is no indication of any impending risk of such events. The MD&A section
of the 2001 Annual Report announced the company’s freestanding Sustainability
Report and stated that “overall environmental performance at Red Dog remains on
par with the best mines in the world.”
The company’s position is that it had no reason to regard an environmental law
suit as likely because it took actions to correct water quality problems, its studies did
not show that its efﬂuents presented health or ecological problems above those
inherent in background conditions, and that it operated with the concurrence of
environmental regulatory agencies. Moreover, it holds that the lawsuit was not a
material event. However, investors may not have agreed: in the ﬁve-business-day
window surrounding the announcement of the forthcoming suit, the company’s
stock price fell by ten percent.
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Anvil Range Mining Company – The Faro Mine
The Event

In 1994, the Anvil Range Mining Company purchased the Faro Mine property in the
Yukon from a receiver that was handling the assets of Curragh Resources, which went
bankrupt in 1992. Anvil operated the mine intermittently into 1997. Anvil declared
bankruptcy in April of 1998,59 although in the fall of 1997 the company had declared
assets of $162.5 million and liabilities of $93.8 million. At the time that Anvil received
court protection from creditors, its outstanding debt was over $30 million.60 Anvil
Range claimed that their bankruptcy was due to low lead and zinc prices. However,
at that time the Faro Mine faced closure and remediation costs that had been esti
mated at $124 million in 1993, before Anvil Range purchased the mine, against which
Anvil held a Reclamation Securities Trust that was funded at the level of $12.5 million.
Background

Following Curragh Resources’s abandonment of the Faro properties in 1993, the
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Canada (DIAND) studied
the cost of closure and cleanup at the site. A 1993 engineer’s report commissioned by
DIAND estimated that the cleanup of Faro would cost $124 million in discounted
present value terms.61 At that time Cominco Ltd. also considered acquiring the Faro
property but judged that the liability could well be in the $125 million range and
decided not to pursue the acquisition.62 In a letter dated February 22 1994, Richard D.
Minor of Cominco told the receiver in charge of the Faro properties that Cominco
had determined a reclamation liability of about $120 million63 and largely for this rea
son had decided not to purchase the properties.64 Curragh had made a lower estimate
in the $55 million range on the assumption that mine tailings would be reprocessed,
an assumption that Cominco dismissed.
In November 1994, Anvil Range entered an agreement with DIAND to establish a
Reclamation Security Trust for the Faro property that was capped at $100 million and
would be funded on a units of production basis, with contributions rising and falling
with the net price of zinc. By the end of October 1995 the RST had accumulated $9.4
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million and a year later the fund stood at $11.6 million. In October 1995, Anvil Range
had also recognized a liability of $43.5 million for environmental remediation on the
property, having adopted Curragh’s assumptions that reprocessing of tailings and
lower reclamation standards would bring the costs well below those estimated for
DIAND two years earlier.
As the result of this arrangement, in which DIAND had concurred, falling zinc
prices lowered the company’s contributions to the Reclamation Securities Trust at the
same time that the reprocessing of tailings became less economical, raising the com
pany’s reclamation liabilities. The company never made this risk clear as zinc prices
ﬂuctuated, nor did it disclose a current estimate of the environmental liability in the
event that reprocessing of tailings proved infeasible. By 1998, when the company
declared bankruptcy, inﬂation and the increased volume of waste materials had raised
the previous estimated cost of $125 million to the $145-150 million range.
A ﬁnal reclamation plan for the site has not been completed. However, a report
from Canada’s Commissioner on Environment and Sustainable Development esti
mated in 2002 that cleanup at Faro will cost at least $200 million.65 David Sherstone,
the person directly in charge of the cleanup effort for DIAND, estimates that the
cleanup will cost between $200 million and $250 million, which he characterized as
“almost certainly an underestimate.”66 Other estimates range as high as $400 mil
lion.67 DIAND has already given $40 million to Anvil Range’s interim receiver for
reclamation at the site; this number is not included in any of the estimates for com
pleting reclamation.68
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Disclosures

The company consistently stated in its ﬁnancial disclosures that it expected the
amounts accumulating in the RST to be adequate to meet its closure and reclamation
obligations at Faro. In its 1996 Annual Information Form released in mid-1997, for
example, it stated
“While the RST [Reclamation Securities Trust] together with the amounts
secured by existing security arrangements under the Water Licenses are
expected to be adequate to fund the closure liabilities of all these properties,
based on the ICAP [Integrated Comprehensive Abandonment Plan], Anvil
Range remains liable for such liabilities notwithstanding the existence of the
RST. Anvil Range’s on-going costs to maintain the mines in environmental
compliance on the Faro Properties will be funded from operating cash
ﬂow.”69
In its 1997 Annual Report, the company discussed the situation at Faro as follows:
“The Water Licenses also contain provisions relating to the reclamation and
eventual abandonment of the mining and mill sites and require Anvil Range
to submit plans for conducting those activities in an environmentally safe
manner for the Water Board’s review. Accordingly, in 1996, the Integrated
Comprehensive Abandonment Plan (“ICAP”) and the Tailings Reprocessing
Feasibility Study were ﬁled with the Yukon Territory. The reports describe
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Anvil Range’s plans for providing adequate protection to downstream ﬁsh
eries and other natural resources upon mine closure.”
“Abandonment of the Vangorda and Grum open pits will be undertaken in
stages when fully depleted. Final abandonment of the Faro Properties will be
dependent on whether or not Anvil Range locates additional reserves, and
will be unlikely to occur prior to 2010 although Anvil Range will take certain
reclamation measures before then. . ..”
“While Anvil Range generally endorses the technical approach proposed by
Curragh in dealing with the monitoring, recycling, and reclamation of
tailings and dumps left behind by it and other predecessor operators at the
Faro Properties, Anvil Range has made signiﬁcant modiﬁcations to the
approach to funding the Faro Properties’ environmental liabilities. Anvil
Range executed as of November 8, 1994 a Reclamation Security Agreement
(“RSA”) with the Federal Government as represented by the Department of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development (“DIAND”) relating to
environmental matters . . . . Pursuant to the RSA, Anvil Range has created a
Reclamation Security Trust (“RST”), which will fund its environmental
closure liabilities on the Faro Properties on an ongoing basis. The RST is
managed by an independent trustee, who obtains independent investment
counsel for investment decisions. The RST, together with existing security
arrangements under the Water Licenses, will have a maximum contribution
limit of $100 million, inclusive of interest, subject to downward adjustment
for reclamation expenditures made before ﬁnal mine closure. If after the
earlier of October 3, 2001 or October 31 of the year in which Anvil Range has
on a commercial basis commenced reprocessing of tailings (and subject to a
review every three years thereafter) the estimated closure liabilities related to
the Faro Properties exceed the then current maximum contribution limit,
the limit will be increased quarterly thereafter by the amount of the
Canadian Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deﬂator applied to the
difference at that time between the balance in the RST and such estimated
closure liabilities.”
“The RST will be applicable to the decommissioning and reclamation of
mining and related activities relating to the historical operations of the Faro
Properties and to future operations at the Faro Properties. While the RST
together with the amounts secured by existing security arrangements under
the Water Licenses are expected to be adequate to fund the closure liabilities
of all these properties, based on the ICAP, Anvil Range remains liable for
such liabilities notwithstanding the existence of the RST. Anvil Range’s on
going costs to maintain the mines in environmental compliance on the Faro
Properties will be funded from operating cash ﬂow.”
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“The RST will be funded by a net smelter royalty (“NSR”) which is deter
mined as a percentage of the net sales proceeds of Anvil Range from sales of
zinc and lead concentrates derived from the Faro Properties after deducting
ocean freight, smelter treatment charges and other off-shore charges. The
royalty calculation applies to all mine revenue but the rate of the NSR will be
determined on a graduating scale based on prevailing zinc prices commenc
ing at a zinc price of US $0.50 per pound.”
Thus, up to the brink of bankruptcy, Anvil Range continued to maintain that it
had adequately provided for reclamation of the Faro Mine and failed to disclose its
increasing liability as its strategy for funding the reclamation disintegrated.
Manhattan Minerals – Tambogrande
The Event

Manhattan Minerals Corporation, a Canadian mining company headquartered in
Vancouver, is devoted to the international exploration and development of mining
properties, with a heavy strategic emphasis on northern Peru, where its concessions
at Tambogrande are located. Manhattan Minerals Corporation shares trade on the
Toronto Stock Exchange. It acquired a concession to develop the Tambogrande
deposits in 1997 from President Fujimori and began exploratory studies. On June 2,
2002, the residents of the town where the mine would be located conducted a
referendum on the question of whether the mine project should go forward. Over 93
percent of those participating voted “No.”
Manhattan Minerals’ stock price fell by approximately 30 percent in the following
days, proving that the results constituted a material event to investors. Moreover, in
September 2002, the company announced that due to “volatility in equity markets”
the company was postponing a private placement and re-pricing signiﬁcantly down
wards share purchase warrants that it had issued a year earlier. This increased the
company’s difﬁculties in demonstrating to the Peruvian government that it had the
ﬁnancing to develop the concession property, a question then at issue. In December
2003, this issue formed the announced basis for the government’s decision that
Manhattan Minerals had not fulﬁlled the ﬁnancial requirements of the project and
had forfeited its concession rights. Therefore, the referendum was clearly a material
ﬁnancial event for the company.
Background

70

Prospective mining activity in the Tambogrande region dates from 1978, when the
Peruvian government declared the district of Tambogrande a national reserve in
which mining development was in the national interest of the country and author
ized the French company Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) to
carry out a pre-feasibility study. The government’s efforts to establish a mine in
Tambogrande in the 1980s failed largely because there was already opposition from
the local population.
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On May 6, 1999, the regime of President Alberto Fujimori published a supreme
decree allowing Manhattan Minerals Corporation to acquire ten mining concession
rights covering a territory of 10,000 hectares in Tambogrande, which includes an
urban area and an area slated for urban expansion. On May 14, 1999, another supreme
decree incorporated the Tambogrande mining project, formed of Manhattan
Minerals Corporation and Minero Perú, a government corporation. Manhattan
Minerals Corporation purchased the concession rights and preliminary studies from
BRGM and the government granted Manhattan Minerals exploration rights over
10,000 hectares for a period of four years as of May 6, 1999.
The May 1999 agreement between the government and Manhattan Minerals stip
ulated that a new company, Empresa Minera Tambogrande, be created to operate the
mine. Manhattan Minerals would own 75 percent of the company and the other 25
percent would be owned by Minero Perú, a state-owned company. The agreement
also stipulated that Manhattan Minerals, alone or with a partner, must hold assets of
US$100 million and that the average processing capacity of the mine be 10,000 tons
of rock per day, using methods and technologies that would not affect the infrastruc
ture of the town of Tambogrande or harm the population or cause damage to the sur
rounding agricultural areas.
The Tambogrande district, with a population of approximately 70,000, is in the
Department of Piura, where commercial agriculture has become the main economic
activity, largely because of an internationally ﬁnanced irrigation project. Limes, mangos, rice, carob, and other foodstuffs for domestic consumption and for export are
produced there, generating hundreds of millions of dollars in annual sales. The town
of Tambogrande, under which are located the main deposits, has a population of
about 16,000.
Manhattan Minerals undertook geophysical studies in 1997 and carried out
exploratory drilling during the summer of 1999, conﬁrming the existence of signiﬁ
cant gold and silver deposits under part of the town of Tambogrande. In addition,
other deposits were discovered one kilometer and thirteen kilometers south of
Tambogrande. In 1999, when exploratory drilling in the urban area began, the oppo
sition to mining that had existed for years began to mobilize again and grew signiﬁ
cantly, much of it under the leadership of the Tambogrande Defense Front, an organ
ization composed of delegates elected by consensus in the ten zones of the
Tambogrande district and delegates from the urban area. The leaders of the Front are
elected annually and the president is elected in a general public meeting of the entire
population.
The “Tambogrande” project, as presented by Manhattan Minerals Corporation,
contained the following: a 250 meter deep open-pit mine affecting a total area of 750
hectares within the present boundaries of the town, requiring the relocation of
approximately 8000 residents and the purchase of 540 hectares of agricultural land;
the diversion of the Piura River; an ore processing plant; a mine tailings pond and
other facilities. The mine in Tambogrande has a projected life span of approximately
10 years, exclusive of closure, remediation, and long-term monitoring.
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As required by law, an environmental impact assessment study was prepared by an
international consulting ﬁrm hired by the company, to be submitted by Manhattan
Minerals Corporation to the Peruvian government. According to the company’s
directors, the study would respect the environmental and social standards established
by the World Bank’s Multilateral Investments Guarantee Agency (MIGA), including
standards for relocation and compensation.
During the period from 1997 through the date of the referendum, Manhattan
Minerals carried out extensive discussions, meetings and consultations with local
government ofﬁcials and residents. The company disseminated information about
the project and also built model homes to show what relocation of townspeople
would bring. Nonetheless, opposition within the community and from groups out
side the community continued.
One of the central issues for opponents in Tambogrande concerned the powers the
local population possessed to participate in the decision on the granting of mining
concessions in an area that is privately owned, inhabited, and under cultivation.
Consultation with the provincial and the district municipality was a legal prerequi
site that was not met before the central government granted concessions.
Despite the company’s assurances, opponents also feared risks to and long-term
degradation of water resources and the environment. A preliminary EIA of the
Tambogrande project made public by Manhattan Minerals Corporation in July 2000
was evaluated by geologist Robert Moran in May 2001. Mr. Moran reported several
inadequacies in the preliminary study. He also argued that the proposed mine could
cause a drop in levels of the surface and underground water necessary for agriculture,
contaminate ground water because of acid runoff from the mine and risk ecological
disaster related to El Niño, which generates torrential rains in the region every three
or four years. He recommended that adequate environmental studies be carried out
by consultants independent of and not hired by the company.
During the same period, the Front held many meetings with company representa
tives, including one with the then president, Mr. Graham Clow, on June 12, 2000. At
this meeting, a document was signed in which the company recognized the Front as
a “natural and legitimate representative,” and committed itself to “respecting the deci
sions of the population that result from the process of dialogue that should continue
from this time onward.”
At the beginning of 2001, because of the concerns of a large number of his fellow
citizens, the mayor, who had granted the permit for exploratory activity within the
town, changed his position and gathered the signatures of approximately 28,000
citizens (75 percent of voters) of Tambogrande demanding the termination of
activities related to mining in the region and the withdrawal of Manhattan Minerals
Corporation This petition was presented to the Peruvian Congress and several public
institutions, but did not receive any response.
On February 16, 2001, the municipal council resolved to respect the will of the
residents to oppose the government's wish to grant authorization to the mining
project in the district of Tambogrande. A few days later, on February 27 and 28, 2001,
thousands of Tambogrande residents took part in a demonstration organized by the
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Front to demand that Manhattan Minerals leave the region. In the urban area of the
district, the demonstration degenerated into a confrontation with the 300 police
ofﬁcers posted to protect the company’s facilities. Fifteen demonstrators and 25 police
ofﬁcers were injured and many demonstrators were arrested. Afterward, during the
night, unidentiﬁed individuals burned down the model homes constructed by
Manhattan Minerals, vandalized the offices of the company and one of its
subcontractors and destroyed equipment and material.
On March 16, 2001, one month after the resolution of the municipal council had
been passed and two weeks after the violent events, the mayor of Tambogrande
signed a decree rescinding the earlier decree authorizing Manhattan Minerals to carry
out exploratory drilling within the urban and urban expansion zones. The assassina
tion of a community leader, Godofredo García Baca, on March 31, 2001, increased the
climate of tension and distrust on the part of Tambogrande inhabitants. Mr. García
Baca had spoken out against the mining project many times during public assemblies
and in meetings with representatives of the mining company.
Both the mayor of Tambogrande and the leaders of the Defense Front assert that
they initiated the idea of holding a municipal referendum on mining development in
their region in order to ﬁnd a mechanism by which the very strong opposition of a
good portion of the population could be expressed peacefully. On June 23, 2001, The
Economist reported that Carlos Herrera, Peru’s energy minister, stated that if the cit
izens of Tambogrande didn’t want the mine to go ahead, it wouldn’t, even though
there was nothing legally binding about the citizens’ feelings.71 A municipal order of
October 11, 2001, created the consulta vecinal as a mechanism for citizen participation
in the district of Tambogrande, using for justiﬁcation
●

●

The municipal organic law, which establishes the responsibility of the
municipal authority in development planning and the competency of the
municipal authority to promote and deﬁne the mechanisms of public par
ticipation in community development;
The law establishing rights of participation and control by citizens, which
provides for the mechanisms of citizen participation at the municipal
level, without deﬁning those mechanisms.

The municipal council resolution of October 11, 2001, stated that citizens were to
respond, negatively or afﬁrmatively, by secret ballot, to the following question: “Do
you agree with the development of mining activities in the urban, urban expansion,
agricultural, and agricultural expansion zones in the district of Tambogrande?”
The resolution also called on the Peruvian national electoral agency to organize the
municipal referendum. However, the national government clearly opposed the refer
endum process, stating that it was not a legal mechanism provided for under the
applicable legislative framework for approval or rejection of a mining project and
that decisions should await the completion of the environmental and social impact
assessment.
Nonetheless, the community continued to organize the referendum. The electoral
regulations allowed for the constitution of two groups to promote the two options
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citizens were to vote on, the YES option and the NO option. The NO campaign was
primarily organized by the Defense Front, with the support of member organizations
from the Technical Committee, including the ﬁnancial support of Oxfam UK. The
mining company declined to campaign for the YES side on the grounds that the
public did not yet have the information contained in the EIA and so could be
manipulated by political or ideological interests instead of making a decision on the
basis of technical information. The company representatives also maintained that the
consultation had no legal validity and that a NO majority would not lead to the
project’s termination.
In the voting, out of a total population of 36,937 registered voters, 27,015 ballots
were issued, a participation rate of 73.14 percent. The NO side won with 25,381 votes,
or 93.95 percent of the vote, taking into account spoiled or blank ballots. Counting
only the ballots for the YES and the NO side, the NO side won with 98.65 percent.
In reaction, the Peruvian government repeated that submission of the EIA fol
lowed by public hearings were the legal steps toward a decision concerning the future
of the Manhattan Sechura project in Tambogrande. The Minister of Energy and
Mines repeated that the municipal consultation had no legal validity. However, the
Deputy Minister of Mines acknowledged that the result of the vote revealed such
massive opposition to mining activity that the government could not ignore it.
Disclosures

Throughout 2001 and 2002, the company’s press releases and ﬁnancial reports dis
cussed its consultations with the community and progress in carrying out the
Environmental Impact Assessment. However, the ﬁrst mention of the referendum
came in a press release dated February 14, 2002, in which the company declared
“On February 10, 2002 the Ministry of Energy and Mines published in the
ofﬁcial gazette its resolution to enforce existing laws in Peru that prevents
local municipalities from calling referendums on issues which conﬂict with
National laws. Speciﬁcally, the Government of Peru has now publicly stated
their legal findings that a referendum on mining in the District of
Tambogrande is not legal and that the Government will enforce the existing
laws against such a referendum through the National Prosecutor if
necessary.”
No indication was given in that release that the popular referendum constituted a
material risk to the company’s project or plans or a risk to investors.
The referendum was not mentioned again in company disclosures until June 2002,
when the company issued a lengthy press release discussing the referendum.
Although the discussion of the referendum is in the future tense, the press release
itself is dated June 2, 2002, the date on which the voting took place. This press release
did not indicate the results of the voting nor the criticisms in Moran’s review of the
mining studies. Also, many of the events leading up to the referendum, now recited
as background information, had not been previously disclosed by the company.
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“On June 2, 2002 the residents of the District of Tambogrande will be asked
to participate in an opinion poll on mining development in their communi
ty. The results of this opinion poll are not binding on any of the participants
or parties involved in the process. It is expected the results of the poll will be
used as part of a larger public relations campaign being fashioned to dis
courage industrial development in Peru rather than as a constructive expres
sion of social interest in a local development project. The ‘consulta popular’
or opinion poll being called for June 2, 2002, has been commissioned by
OXFAM United Kingdom and is scheduled to occur two days prior to a
nationwide anti-industrial development campaign being funded by, and
incorporating, a wide number of national and international NGOs, includ
ing the National Committee Coordinator of Communities Affected by
Mining (CONACAMI).”
“Manhattan’s position has been, and continues to be, that the company must
gain a social license to operate and receive a positive consensus from the pop
ulation impacted by the project before constructing a mine. But the June 2nd
opinion poll has no validity on a social license to operate. It is impossible for
those most impacted by the project to provide an informed opinion about
the viability, beneﬁts, and risks of a project, without being able to review the
independent technical, economic, and social issues that are researched in the
Feasibility Study and Environmental Impact Assessment. The timing of this
opinion poll puzzles us in that it is scheduled a few weeks prior to the release
of the company’s Feasibility Study and Environmental Impact Assessment.”
“What’s more, the June 2nd, 2002 opinion poll commissioned by OXFAM
United Kingdom runs counter to recommendations made in the August 15,
2002 OXFAM America-funded report, An Alternative Look at a Proposed
Mine In Tambogrande, Peru published by Robert Moran of the Mineral
Policy Center, and Environmental Mining Council. In his report, Moran
concurs with Manhattan’s position that informed decisions about develop
ment cannot be made until all of the independently researched information
is available to community members.”
“As a ﬁrst step, Manhattan Minerals must provide a full impact assessment,
including a comprehensive and ﬁnal baseline study, and should provide
community leaders with resources to conduct their own independent assess
ment of Manhattan’s conclusions. It is only on this basis that those affected
can make an informed decision about whether or not they wish to accept the
likely impacts of this mine on their environment, livelihoods and communi
ty, in exchange for the potential economic beneﬁts of a large scale mining
operation.”
“This supports Manhattan’s views regarding informed decisions.”
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“Since there are no reputable independent public relations ﬁrms, Peruvian
NGOs or government agencies involved in the opinion polling—The
Defensoria del Pueblo, the Ofﬁcina Nacional del Proccesos Electorales, the
Jurado National de Elecciones, and Transparencia have all declined to par
ticipate—and OXFAM is not heeding its own advice, Manhattan believes the
results of the opinion poll have no validity.”
“The following provides background on the June 2, 2002 opinion poll being
conducted in the District of Tambogrande.
Background
●

●

●

●

●

On October 11, 2001, the Town Council of the District of Tambogrande,
Peru passed Ordinance No O12-2001-MDT-C, creating a mechanism for
citizen’s participation. On the same day the Council passed Resolution
020-2001-MDT-CM which enabled the council to develop a neighbor
hood opinion poll regarding mining activity in the District.
Concurrent to the Town Council’s resolutions the Defensoria del Pueblo
(Peruvian Ombudsman Organization) was organizing a Table of
Dialogue for the stakeholders of the Tambogrande mining project. The
ﬁrst meeting, including the Mayor of Tambogrande, was held on October
21, 2001 and the Mayor conﬁrmed the opinion poll (Consulta Popular)
would not be held in view of the progress being made in organizing the
dialogue process. In particular the participation of the Defensoria del
Pueblo.
On November 24th, 2001, the Defense Front of Tambogrande withdrew
from the Dialogue process, claiming the Defensoria del Pueblo, the
Minister of Energy and Mines, and the Minister of Agriculture were
biased.
The Mayor and town council of Tambogrande subsequently approached
the National Ofﬁce of Electoral Processes (ONPE) to organize a Consulta
Popular to gauge community support for the project and make the
majority’s opinion legally binding.
On January 17th, 2002, ONPE issued Resolution 020-2002-J/ONPE (pub
lished January 19th, 2002), and on March 22nd, 2002 ONPE issued
Resolution 098-2002-J/ONPE (published April 26th, 2002) in which it
stated “the popular consultation referred under Municipal Decision 012
2001-MDT-C and Council Agreement 020-2001-MDT-CM, both dated
October 11, 2001, issued by the Tambogrande District Municipality, are
not binding, and consequently do not obligate ONPE to organize, plan
and execute said consultation.”
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●

●

●

●

On February 9th, 2002 the Peruvian Government, Ministry of Energy and
Mines agreed and published Resolution 066-2002-EM/DM indicating
any Consulta Popular in the Tambogrande Municipality would have no
legal or binding basis.
On February 14th, 2002, in Piura, Peru, Julio Bonelli, General Director on
Environmental Affairs from the Ministry of Energy and Mines, and
Matias Prieto Celo, Chief of INRENA held a press conference conﬁrming
the non legally binding consulta popular, and introduced an accepted
formal public process of consultation for reviews of industrial develop
ment. At this same press conference they conﬁrmed that an independent
team would monitor Manhattan’s Environmental Impact Assessment.
On April 20, 2002, the Mayor of the District of Tambogrande issued
Decree 003-2002-MDT-A calling for a neighborhood opinion poll for
Sunday, June 2, 2002—just weeks prior to the completion of the
independently monitored Environmental Impact Assessment. The Mayor
also appointed Fredy Martin Giraldo Rivera as technical council for the
opinion poll.
As of May 10th, 2002 the Ofﬁce of the Electoral Processes (ONPE) with
drew all of its advisory and logistical support for the Tambogrande
Municipality. On May 11th, after the complete withdrawal of the Peruvian
Ofﬁce of Electoral Processes the Mayor of Tambogrande proceeded to
present the committee and advisor for what now constitutes a public
opinion poll.”

On the following day, June 3, 2002, the CEO of Manhattan Minerals issued a pub
lic statement providing the results of the voting but again dismissed them as politi
cally motivated and non-binding. In this statement, he also revealed that in the pre
vious year’s protests the company’s ofﬁce in Tambogrande had been destroyed.
Subsequent statements, such as a press release dated August 29, 2002, were generally
optimistic:
“Just after the quarter ended the second informal meeting was held with
Peruvian government regulatory agencies to discuss aspects of the EIS. The
informal information session was well received by authorities and
Manhattan does not expect the Tambogrande EIS review process to differ
from the normal EIS review process, except for the request for additional
public audiences. Manhattan welcomes the additional public audiences, and
plans to utilize these interactions to gain the necessary community accept
ance and to obtain a mine development permit.”
In summary, the strong local opposition to Manhattan Mineral’s project in
Tambogrande, which was the company’s principal asset, culminating in an over
whelmingly negative vote in the community referendum in June 2002, was a materi
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al risk and a known uncertainty in the months leading up to the voting. The over
whelmingly negative vote in that event resulted in a signiﬁcant loss to shareholders
and contributed to the challenge facing the company in attracting the capital needed
to meet the ﬁnancial conditions in its concession agreement. The company’s disclo
sures in the months prior to the referendum did not disclose this risk adequately to
investors.
Cambior – The Omai Mine
The Event

Overnight between August 19 and 20, 1995, the tailings dam failed at the Omai mine
in Guyana, releasing approximately 4 million cubic meters of cyanide-laden mine
waste into the Omai river, which feeds into the Essequibo, which eventually runs
through the capital. Eighty kilometers of the Essequibo River were contaminated, ani
mal and aquatic life suffered, and a large percentage of the local residents reported
negative health effects.72 Cambior, a Canadian company, owned 65 percent of Omai
Gold Mines Ltd., the operating company, Golden Star owned 30 percent and a
Guyana government corporation owned the remaining 5 percent.
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Mineral Resources Forum.

Material Financial Effects on the Corporation

Cambior’s stock plummeted 23 percent between Friday, August 18, 1995 and Monday,
August 21, 1995. Trading volume went from about 27,000 on the 18th to about 3.7 mil
lion on the 21st. Golden Star Resources, the minority owner, experienced a similarly
sharp decline in its stock value.73 Moreover, the dam remained closed for months
while the failure was investigated and a new tailings impoundment was constructed,
resulting in substantial loss of income and additional costs for the company.
Therefore, the dam failure and spill was clearly a ﬁnancially material event.
The ﬁnancial consequences did not stop there, however. In 1999, Guyanese citizens
tried to sue Cambior for $100 million in damages in Canadian courts. The suit was
dismissed in 1997 on the grounds that the Guyanese did not have standing to sue in
Canada. Another class action lawsuit was ﬁled in May of 2003 on behalf of 23,000
Guyanese, claiming $1 billion in damages against Cambior. Cambior has refused to
settle, claiming that there is no merit to the suit’s claims.74
The Background

The tailings dam spanned the valley of the Omai River and was designed to rise in
stages to a height of 534 meters. Construction began in 1991. A diversion conduit was
constructed to carry the river waters through the dam. The dam crest was at 534
meters and the water level was at 529.6 meters at the time of failure, less than 5 meters
below the top of the dam. Virtually all of the impounded water was lost when the dam
failed.
The subsequent investigations provided considerable information about the
reasons for the event. The Process Review Committee, appointed by the Guyana
Geology and Mines Committee to advise on plans for the mine’s reopening and waste
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management, stated in its November 1995 report that, at the time of the failure, the
amount of ﬂuid in storage was eight times larger than the amount speciﬁed in the
project’s 1991 Environmental Impact Statement, which was the only operating plan in
existence for the Omai Mine project. In fact, the EIS speciﬁed a maximum of 0.5
million cubic feet, about one-eighth the amount of liquid released when the dam
failed.75
There were two signiﬁcant reasons why so much water was being stored behind the
dam. One was that in Guyana’s tropical climate, heavy annual precipitation in the
watershed created a positive water balance in the impoundment, requiring that liq
uids be released periodically from the dam. The second reason, however, was that
prior to the spill the cyanide content of the liquid in storage was too high for it to be
released into the river. The company anticipated that natural degradation would
reduce the cyanide content of the liquid in storage, obviating the need for additional
treatment with hydrogen peroxide, which they opposed.76 However, in May 1995,
Cambior applied to the government of Guyana for a modification of its
Environmental Impact Statement allowing release of water with a cyanide content of
8 ppm, four times higher than that prescribed in its 1991 EIS. “This request was moti
vated primarily by the fact that the company was reluctant to raise further the level
of the dam . . . even though water levels would have exceeded the maximum permis
sible by June 1995.”77 This request was denied, so the volume of water in storage con
tinued to increase, raising pressure at the upstream dam face and reducing the
amount of freeboard at the dam’s summit below that prescribed in the
Environmental Impact Statement.
In addition, according to the report78 of the Dam Review Team to the Guyana
Geology and Mines Committee, appointed to study the dam failure, the failure
resulted from ﬂaws in the dam’s design and construction. The dam construction
consisted of:
●

●

●

●

“a sloping core constructed of low-permeability, clayey saprolite79 soils.
The purpose of the core is to limit and control seepage through the dam.
a thin zone of coarse-rock “riprap” along theupstream side of the core to
protect it from wave and rainfall erosion.
a primary zone of compacted rock ﬁll that comprises the main structural
body of the dam.
a thin zone of ﬁlter sand whose intent is to prevent ﬁne soil particles in
the core ﬁll from migrating into and through the voids between the coarse
rock ﬁll fragments under the inﬂuence of dam seepage.”

The Dam Review Team considered several reasons why other tailings dams had
failed, including seismic activity, ﬂoods, mine subsidence and other natural events.
All were ruled out. Instead, the Team pointed to ﬂaws in the dam itself:
“It is our current judgment that failure of the dam was caused by massive
loss of core integrity resulting from internal erosion of the dam ﬁll, a process
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also known as piping. This means simply that ﬁner particles from one soil
moved freely under the inﬂuence of seepage forces into and through the
interstitial voids of adjacent coarser soil due to excessive disparity between
particle sizes of the two soils.”
“We believe this process began at the interface between the ﬁlter sand and the
compacted rock ﬁll. Loss of ﬁlter sand into the rock ﬁll left the overlying
saprolite core material unsupported and subject to the development of cavi
ties, softened zones, and cracks as its particles too moved into the rock ﬁll.
Cavity development in the core ﬁll is likely to have propagated undetected
for some period of time until reaching the reservoir at and above the slimes
level. The ﬁnal breakthrough of these cavities formed “pipes,” or tunnels, in
the core ﬁll at multiple locations that allowed uncontrolled ﬂow of water into
and then longitudinally through the rock ﬁll zone of the dam. These features
are now manifested by sinkholes on the upstream slope of the dam, as core
ﬁll and riprap have subsided into the open voids.”
“There are believed to be two primary physical defects in the dam that
allowed this process to occur, one related to ﬁlter incompatibility between
the sand and rock ﬁll zones, and another involving the diversion conduit.
Both were produced by known or suspected deﬁciencies in design, con
struction, or construction inspection, either singularly or in combination.
[Emphasis added.] Moreover, defects related to ﬁlter incompatibility and the
diversion conduit may not be mutually exclusive, and may have interacted in
complementary ways not yet fully understood.”
“Internal erosion between zones of adjacent soils is prevented by controlling
their particle size distributions (or gradations) according to ﬁlter design cri
teria developed over 50 years ago and little changed since then. These ﬁlter
criteria were applied in the dam design, which limited the gradation of the
rock ﬁll directly adjacent to the ﬁlter sand. Current design practice also rec
ognizes that coarse material is prone to particle-size segregation during con
struction that has often allowed internal erosion to occur even when other
ﬁlter design criteria have been satisﬁed. According to supplemental criteria
that address this problem, the transition zone rock ﬁll should not have
exceeded a maximum speciﬁed particle size of about 25-50mm, whereas the
design allows for fragments as large as 600mm. Therefore, the transition
zone rock ﬁll as speciﬁed would have been highly susceptible to particle size
segregation and consequent ﬁlter incompatibility.”

“These design deﬁciencies notwithstanding, it is apparent that the transition
zone rock ﬁll was never included in the dam during construction in any
complete or systematic way. Even if properly designed, meticulous adherence
to transition rock ﬁll gradation speciﬁcations at each and every location
within the dam would have been mandatory to ensure its safety against
internal erosion. By contrast, construction documentation and existing
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conditions on the dam crest indicate that pit-run rock ﬁll of essentially
unrestricted gradation was placed directly against the ﬁlter sand, without
adequate construction control of this critical feature.” [Emphasis added.]
“Rock ﬁll placement was supervised during construction of the initial stages
of the dam and is believed to have been inspected or observed by several geo
technical engineers on various occasions. Such gross disparity of particle sizes
between the ﬁlter sand and adjacent rock ﬁll as can be currently seen on the
dam crest should have been visually evident to any experienced geo-technical
engineer, along with equally clear implications for ﬁlter incompatibility
between the two materials. However, we have been provided with no
information to indicate that any such supervision, inspection, or observation
sufﬁciently recognized the severity of this condition, adequately warned of its
potential consequences, or undertook measures necessary to correct it.”
“In basic terms then, the rock ﬁll adjacent to the ﬁlter sand was simply too
coarse to prevent the sand from washing into and through it, and both
potential and actual problems this produced appear to have gone unrecog
nized or uncorrected throughout the sequence of design and construction
until the failure occurred.”
The Dam Review Committee thus found that the failure was caused primarily by
faulty design and construction that went unrecognized or uncorrected. Evidence
from other sources, discussed below, indicates that the problems were not unknown
but remained uncorrected.
With respect to the conduit carrying water through the dam, the Review Team
found that:
“The pattern, nature, and distribution of surﬁcial damage provide circum
stantial evidence to suggest that the corrugated steel diversion conduit was
associated with internal erosion processes. Furthermore, problems related to
conduits in general have been responsible for a signiﬁcant proportion of
earth dam and tailings dam failures, and in particular the use of unencased
corrugated metal culverts through dam cores is considered bad practice.”
“Since the remaining slimes behind the dam and saturation levels within it
are likely to preclude any excavation or direct inspection of the conduit,
actual damage it may have experienced or produced may never be complete
ly known. “Additionally, design details for the conduit were not only ambigu
ous from the start but also underwent continuing change from the feasibili
ty design continuing on throughout construction, making it difﬁcult for us
to fully assess the intent of the design or the actual as-built conditions. One
largely unexplained aspect is that the evolution of conduit design and con
struction appears to have progressed in several important respects from
more conservative to less conservative over time, resulting in a number of
irregularities. It is known that the corrugated steel culvert was crushed by

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

robert repetto

57

heavy equipment and repaired at two separate locations and occasions dur
ing construction, suggesting the possibility that other latent damage might
have gone unrecognized.”
“The nature of corrugated metal culverts is such that they must deform
(from circular to slightly oval shape) in order to develop load-carrying
capacity. This raises the possibility that deformation incompatibility between
the rigid grouted section and the deformable open section may have caused
structural failure, or that the combined ﬁll, slimes, and water loads may sim
ply have exceeded the structural capacity of the culvert in the critical region
beneath the Stage 1A starter dyke. Any such structural failure would have
produced a void or allowed soil to enter the conduit, providing a direct path
for concentrated seepage and cavity formation within the ﬁll.”
“Even so, structural failure of the conduit would not necessarily have been
required for concentrated seepage and internal erosion to initiate and prop
agate along the outer surface of the conduit, a common occurrence without
adequate safeguards. The details of conduit backﬁlling and as-built con
struction are important in assessing this mechanism, and our ongoing inves
tigation is continuing to evaluate it. There is evidence to indicate that sand
was used for culvert backﬁll beneath some portion of the Stage 1A starter
dyke. Concentrated seepage within this sand may have produced internal
erosion at its downstream terminus with the rock ﬁll as a result of ﬁlter
incompatibility issues previously discussed . . . .”
The conclusion of the Dam Review Team indicates that the operating company
knew or should have known of the risks of dam failure:

“In this regard, our investigation to date provides no reason to believe that
the failure was related to any concealed geologic conditions or features, or to
any anomalous behavior or engineering properties of the dam, foundation
or ﬁll soils, that would pertain to other structures at the mine site. The failure
was caused not by some ‘hidden ﬂaw’ but by inadequate application and
execution of sound practices for design, construction, supervision, and
inspection that are well understood in current embankment dam and
tailings dam technology.” (Emphasis added.)
Were the ﬂaws in the dam known to the company as the water levels rose, or
should the company have known about them? The Commission of Enquiry quoted
from faxes between the resident engineer supervising the company’s employees con
structing the dam and the engineering ﬁrm’s head ofﬁce in September 1992, when the
ﬁrst stage of the dam was under construction. The resident engineer pointed out that
with respect to the grades of rock ﬁll adjacent to the ﬁlter sand, “It is fairly certain that
the selected run of mine waste will not satisfy this speciﬁcation. Is there room for
coarsening the speciﬁcation?” The reply came back: “. . . basically we will accept the
ﬁnest of the run of mine muck which should be fairly close to spec (i.e., some coars
ening of spec is acceptable.)”80
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With respect to the diversion culvert, the Commission of Inquiry cited an
exchange of letters between the project engineer and the home ofﬁce:
“Further to our discussion yesterday regarding the grouting of the remaining
33 meters of the diversion culvert, there are two options to be considered:
“Option 1: Drilling 2 HQ holes into the culvert from the embankment crest
and tremie a sand cement mortar into the culvert to complete the grouting
as designed. The argument for doing this is to prevent possible collapse of
the culvert near the upstream face of the embankment.”
The letter continued to say that the load on the corrugated steel culvert would
exceed design maximum by 60 percent and that the cost of implementing this option
would be less than two thousand dollars.
“Option 2: Complete grouting of existing concrete plug and leave the
remainder of the culvert as is . . . and accept the risk that the culvert will
collapse and threaten the integrity of the embankment. This risk is
considered to be small as a high degree of conservatism is built into the
design tables.”
81
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The latter, less conservative option was recommended by the consulting engineer
and accepted by the Omai Mine.81
In summary, this evidence indicates that the company knew that the dam was
being subjected to stresses exceeding its design capacity, that there were ﬂaws in its
construction that could lead to its failure and that any such failure would have disas
trous consequences because of the large volumes of liquids that would be released
and their elevated cyanide concentrations.
In addition, news and other documents refer to reports that are not in the public
domain. A report produced in 1988 for The National, a program put on by the
Canadian Broadcasting Company, cited a U.S. engineer’s report that stated that “We
are at a loss to explain why the design and construction of . . . critical elements of the
dam were executed so inadequately.”82 A coalition of NGOs working on the Omai case
stated that environmental specialists had referred to the Omai Mine as an ongoing
disaster well before the 1995 dam failure.83
In contrast, Cambior’s 1995 Annual Report painted a rather different picture.
According to the statement signed by the CEO and the Chairman of the Board:
“The Commission’s Dam Review Committee conducted a thorough investi
gation of the tailings pond dam and determined the cause to be structural
failure related to the faulty design and site supervision of the ﬁlter zone and
drainage culvert from the initial stage of construction. While Cambior has
consistently applied North American environmental and operating stan
dards to its domestic and foreign activities, the Omai tailings dam failure
reveals that such rare incidents can befall even the most prudent of mining
companies anywhere, at any time.”84
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Cambior disclosed the dam failure and subsequent events in a series of press releases
and ﬁnancial reports. For example, the 1995 CAMBIOR Year End Financial Results Press
Release contains a brief mention of the incident: “. . . 1995 had been a difﬁcult year with
the Omai incident.” Also, “the reduction of cash ﬂow and the reporting of a loss in 1995
are attributable to the interruption of operations at the Omai mine . . ..”85 In subsequent
releases, the company disclosed the results of the various official inquiries,
Management Discussion & Analysis ﬁlings that the build-up the ﬁling and subsequent
progress of lawsuits against it, the resumption of operations at the mine, and other
material facts relevant to the aftermath of the event. Cambior met its disclosure obliga
tions in that regard. However, prior to the event, there was no mention in any of the
company’s reports of liquid behind the dam accumulating to volumes many times
greater than its design capacity, combined with known ﬂaws in the design and con
struction of the dam, constituted a known material risk or uncertainty. Since the com
pany had known as early as 1992 and 1993 that ﬂaws in the construction of the dam
posed risks of failure, it is hard to imagine that those risks, combined with the large vol
umes of liquids with high cyanide concentrations in storage, did not appear through the
eyes of management to pose material risks to the company and its investors.86
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Boliden – Los Frailes
The Event

Overnight between April 24 and 25, 1998, a major portion of a large tailings pond dam
failed at Spain’s Los Frailes mine, owned by the Canadian mining company Boliden,
Limited. A slab of soil beneath the dam 20 meters wide slid approximately one meter
towards Agrio River.The dam cracked and broke abruptly, spilling between ﬁve and
seven million cubic meters of contaminated water and slurries through the gap. The
spill of highly acidic liquids containing high concentrations of metals and other toxic
compounds caused a 3.6 meter increase in the water level of the river as far as 7 kilo
meters below the dam. Three rivers were affected: the Los Frailes, Agrio, and
Guadiamar, along with approximately 5,000 hectares (11,000 acres) of land, much of
which was highly productive farmland.87 Damage was also caused in the Doñana
National Park, a UN World Heritage Site. The Guadiamar River runs directly through
this park. Boliden has spent at least $12 million on cleanup of the Los Frailes spill.88
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Material Consequences

The news of the dam failure prompted a 28 percent decrease in the value of Boliden
Limited’s stock on the Toronto Stock Exchange in the ﬁve days after it was reported.89
The total drop in share value as a result of the disaster is estimated at between $50 and
$100 million Canadian dollars.90 The event also triggered other material conse
quences. On October 2, 2000, Boliden announced that its subsidiary Boliden Apirsa
had ﬁled a court application for bankruptcy. The company would not continue the
development of the Los Frailes mine after October 2001. The Spanish court accepted
this petition.
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A class action lawsuit was ﬁled by the Canadian law ﬁrm Klein Lyons on behalf of
Boliden’s shareholders. The lawsuit alleges negligence on Boliden’s part and claims
millions of dollars in damages as a result of Boliden’s failure to disclose the risk of the
dam breach.91 Moreover, on November 16, 2002, Boliden was sued for $89.9 million
by the Andalucian regional government. Although this case was dismissed on January
2, 2003, the regional government is now trying to recover the money through admin
istrative channels. On August 2, 2002, the Spanish Council of Ministers demanded
that Boliden pay $45 million in penalties for the spill. Boliden refused and this
demand is still pending. The Spanish Government has spent over $275 million clean
ing up after the spill.
The Background
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Aznalcóllar is located in southern Spain, 45 kilometers northwest of Seville. In 1960,
Andaluza de Piritas, SA (Apirsa) was formed as part of the Banco Central SA indus
trial group (now Banco Hispano Americano), in order to acquire and exploit pyro
clast and pyrite deposits. The tailings dam was constructed in 1978 and processing
began with the production of zinc, lead and copper concentrates in 1979. It was
designed and built by Geocisa, another company owned by Banco Central. In 1987,
Apirsa was acquired by the Swedish-Canadian group Boliden, which continued
extraction from the Aznalcóllar open pit until 1996. The company also located anoth
er ore body, called Los Frailes, in the same area. Production from this deposit started
in 1997, with a capacity of 4 million tons per year, using the same processing facilities
and tailings impoundment as Aznalcóllar.
The geology of the valley where the tailings pond and dam were constructed con
sists of a 10-meter layer of alluvial gravel overlying 30 meters of marl.92 The tailings
dam is two kilometers long and one kilometer wide. The embankments are con
structed of a bentonite plug extending through the alluvial sediments one and a half
meters into the clay layer below and are built up with waste rock. At its highest point,
the embankment is currently 30m above ground level and is raised annually by one
meter. The impoundment was designed for 70 metric tons of tailings, equivalent to
32.6 million cubic meters, and had reached almost half its capacity when the dam
failed. The liquid in the impoundment was highly acidic and contained elevated lev
els of copper, lead, zinc and iron.
The principal cause of the Los Frailes accident has been established as deﬁciencies
in the design and construction of the tailing dam by Dragados y Construcciones, and
its associated engineering ﬁrms, Itecsa and Geocisa.93 These deﬁciencies, coupled with
the fragility of clay soil and the high pressures of the water on the clay foundation94
are said to have triggered the dam failure. Essentially, with the weight of tailings
behind it, a segment of the dam slid downhill on its slick clay base. The ﬂow of tail
ings that escaped through the breach caused a rupture of a 50-meter section of the
embankment. About two million cubic meters of liquid and three million cubic
meters of solids were released from the tailings impoundment.95
Complaints had been made to the Andalucian authorities in late 1995 by Boliden
Apirsa’s mining engineer, Manuel Aguilar Campos, about seepage from the tailings
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facility.96 Thereafter, in early 1996, a Spanish environmental group97 ﬁled a complaint
in the Court of First Instance in Sanlúcar la Mayor alleging that defects in the con
struction of successive lifts of the dam wall since 1989 could cause a failure of the walls
and that seepage from the dam was polluting the Agrio and Guadiamar Rivers.98
Shortly after the complaints were made, Boliden-Apirsa and the Spanish authori
ties agreed to commission Geotécnica y Cimientos, S.A. (Geocisa), to conduct a study
of the stability of the dam. This study was reviewed by outside academic experts and
forwarded for review to the appropriate Spanish central and regional authorities. The
study included a review and veriﬁcation of the original 1978 design parameters. It also
included borehole drilling and trench excavation at the dam and laboratory tests and
stability calculations under various hypotheses. In March 1996 the study found no
signs of instability in the dam.
Early in 1996, Boliden-Apirsa also commissioned Golder Associates to carry out a
hydro-geological study to determine the actual extent of the seepage. This study con
cluded that the volume of water seeping through the dam wall and screens were 10
cubic meters per hour, of which 85 percent were being captured by existing contain
ment and pumping systems. Boliden-Apirsa also commissioned Dames & Moore to
investigate and report on possible technical solutions to minimize this seepage.
After its stability study, Geocisa was commissioned to design the next stage of dam
wall lifts required to accommodate tailings from the Los Frailes mine and to make
recommendations for expanded monitoring of the dam. In its June 1996 report,
Geocisa recommended actions to verify that new construction conformed to design
speciﬁcations. Geocisa also recommended that instruments be installed and moni
toring conducted to detect possible movements in the aquifer in the alluvium terrace
and the dam. These recommendations were all accepted by Boliden-Apirsa and sub
sequently implemented by Geocisa under a separate contract.
On 20 June 1996, the regional government issued an order permitting BolidenApirsa to proceed with the next stage of dam wall lifts in accordance with Geocisa’s
design. The authority was satisﬁed that the steps taken by Boliden-Apirsa “conﬁrm
the stability of the tailings dam challenged in the complaint.” The order also stated
that the agency had recommended retaining the current features of the construction
and monitoring the behavior of the dam wall.99
This order terminated the complaint process initiated by Boliden-Apirsa’s ex-min
ing engineer Manuel Aguilar Campos and on 4 March 1997 a Court dismissed the
complaint lodged by the Spanish environmental group, as the facts alleged were
found not to constitute any offense.100
As the dam wall was lifted, a hydraulic barrier was constructed around it, 20-30
meters downhill, to eliminate seepage, and the capacity of the existing water
treatment plant was also increased by 50 percent. In early 1997, Boliden-Apirsa and
Geocisa completed the installation of the recommended monitoring system. In
accordance with the recommendations of Geocisa, piezometers were installed in the
alluvium terrace and did not penetrate into the marl formation. By March 1997,
Geocisa had begun the recommended inspection and reporting program. Geocisa
delivered the ﬁrst of these summary reports (for 1997) to Boliden-Apirsa in March
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1998, one month before the dam failure. The most recent inspection prior to the
failure was on 14 April 1998. None of the inspections and monitoring activities carried
out before the failure indicated any instability in the dam.101
After the event, criminal charges were ﬁled in 1998 against 22 individuals associated
with the company, its contractors, and other organizations, alleging that they had
brought about the accident. On 27 December 2000, the court exonerated the
defendants in the case,102 stating that there was no indication of criminal liability with
regard to the failure of the dam and the toxic spillage.103 An expert report prepared on
behalf of the Court of Sanlúcar la Mayor had stated that the dam failure was due to
the fact that during its construction and enlargement the builders did not take into
account two factors crucial for its stability. The ﬁrst was the susceptibility of clay soil
under the dam to the risk of triggering a dam failure. The second was the high
pressure of the water in the clay foundation.104 Boliden-Apirsa repeatedly stated that
the accident was to be attributed to force majeure. A report on the causes of the dam
failure, published on 29 December 1999 by the regional government of Andalucia,105
supported the company’s position, ﬁnding that the accident was caused by a failure
of the marl formation beneath the impoundment.
However, between 1992 and 1997 several complaints had been made to SEPRONA
(the Environmental Criminal Investigative Police Unit) and to the various courts in
the area regarding both the high levels of toxic chemical that were allegedly seeping
out of the Aznalcóllar Mine into the Agrio River and the possibility that the dam was
unstable. Moreover, the report prepared by Geocisa on behalf of Boliden in June 1996
stated that sliding surfaces were forming in the marl underneath the foundation.
Other technical experts in Spain have also pointed to ﬂaws in the dam’s construc
tion. Rafael Baena Escudero of the Department of Physical Geography and Regional
Geographic Analysis stated:
“In this case, a complete lack of foresight emerged. The dam was built on top
of expansive clays. Within these clays, deformations have occurred, which
were propagated to the soil, readjusting the blocks whenever a movement
occurred. In this sense, the seepage through the marls has the effect that these
layers, the phylosilicates, swell and expand their volume. The opposite hap
pens when they dry out and force the shrinking of the clay. This movement
of expansion/contraction is constant and should have been accounted for.
Especially, after the inclinometers had become deformed: something was
moving. This is a matter of general negligence and not a problem of nature.”
(El Mundo, May 25, 1998)
In addition, according to a report by Geocisa, deformations of the inclinometers
had already been observed in 1997, indicating movement in the dam.
Faced with claims from Spanish authorities for recovery of damages and restora
tion costs, Boliden admitted in a press release dated Feb. 26, 1999, that the tailings
dam was ill designed and blamed its contractor Dragados y Construcciones and its
associated engineering ﬁrms, Itecsa and Geocisa, for the failure. Their “incorrect
interpretation of the geotechnical properties of the Margas Azules (Blue Clay)
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Formation [. . .] facilitated the failure of the tailings dam.”106 In October 2002,
Boliden’s Spanish subsidiary Boliden Apirsa sued Dragados y Construcciones S.A.,
for a minimum of 107 million Euros.
Continuing the litigation, a class action lawsuit was ﬁled in Canada by Klein Lyons
that cites a myriad of warnings from the Spanish government, scientists, and
Boliden’s own engineers of the deﬁciencies in the dam prior to its failure. Lawyers at
Klein Lyons have obtained internal documents that they claim will be crucial in prov
ing these allegations. However, they are conﬁdential and will not be available to the
public until they are entered in court proceedings.107

63

106

107

Disclosures

Nothing in Boliden’s annual reports or interim ﬁnancial statements prior to the dam
failure mentions any possibility of structural problems in the Los Frailes tailings dam.
The company’s Management Discussion & Analysis prior to the event did not treat
the risk of a dam failure as a material uncertainty known to management.
Following the event, which the company disclosed in a press release, Boliden’s
Annual Information Form for 1998, released on April 6, 1999, contained a lengthy
discussion of the failure, the company’s potential liability, and the possible legal
consequences:108
“On April 25, 1998, the Aznalcollar tailings dam failed. Approximately 1.3 mil
lion cubic metres of tailings and 5.5 million cubic metres of tailings water
were discharged into the nearby Rio Agrio, a seasonal watercourse in the
semi-arid Andalucian region. The discharged materials ﬂowed in a south
easterly direction following the course of the riverbed approximately two
kilometres into the Rio Guadiamar and from there further downstream.
Approximately 2,600 hectares of land along the Rio Agrio and the Rio
Guadiamar were covered with tailings. There was limited property damage
but no personal injuries. Immediately after the failure, all mining and milling
activities at Los Frailes were halted. Within three days of the failure, Apirsa
developed a plan for cleaning up the discharged tailings . . ..”
“In November 1998, Apirsa ﬁled a ﬁnal closure and remediation plan for the
tailings facility with the Spanish governmental authorities and applied for
the licences and permits required to implement the plan. Apirsa has not yet
received approval of the plan. Apirsa has, however, completed almost all the
work required by the Spanish governmental authorities to strengthen the
tailings dam. The balance of the work will be completed as soon as the judge
investigating the cause of the tailings dam failure authorizes Apirsa to do so.
See “Investigations into the Cause of the Failure’’ below . . .”
Investigations into the Cause of the Failure
“. . . Immediately after the failure, each of Apirsa and the Spanish govern
mental authorities engaged independent consultants to investigate the cause
of the failure. Subsequently, the investigating judge also engaged independ
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ent consultants to investigate the cause of the failure. Apirsa engaged Eptisa,
Servicios de Ingenier´_a S.A. (“Eptisa”) as its consultant. Apirsa also engaged
an international panel of independent engineering experts from Canada,
Spain and Sweden to review Eptisa’s work and to assist it in preparing its
report.
“To date, Eptisa is the only independent consultant to have delivered its
report. In its report, Eptisa concluded that the tailings dam failed as a result
of a 60 metre lateral displacement of a 700 metre long section of the eastern
portion of the tailings dam. The tailings dam, together with the four metre
thick alluvium terrace upon which it lies and the upper 10 metres of the blue
marl (clay) formation below the alluvium terrace, formed a block which slid,
with almost no deformation of the tailings dam, along a near horizontal
bedding plane in the marl formation. The failure was initiated by
overstressing and progressive failure on the bedding plane and was
inﬂuenced mainly by excess pore pressures induced in the marl formation by
the tailings dam construction process. The failure mechanism developed
during an undetermined period, from an initial stage of slow and progressive
weakening along the bedding plane, eventually reaching instability.”
Position of Apirsa
“In the opinion of Apirsa, neither the work carried out by the independent
consultants involved in the original design, siting and construction of the
tailings dam (which was completed in 1978, nine years before Boliden
acquired Apirsa) nor the work carried out by the independent consultant
engaged by Apirsa in 1996 in connection with the project to increase the
height of the tailings dam to accommodate tailings from the new Los Frailes
mine (which included an assessment of the stability of the tailings dam fol
lowing severe ﬂooding in the area) and thereafter to monitor the stability of
the tailings dam gave any indication of the possible failure of the tailings
dam.”
“In February 1999, Apirsa received the report of its geotechnical consultant,
Principa-EQE, which identiﬁed three signiﬁcant deﬁciencies with respect to
the work carried out by third parties in connection with the original design,
siting and construction of the tailings dam and the project to increase the
height of the tailings dam in 1996. The ﬁrst deﬁciency relates to the overesti
mation by the designers of the rate at which the weight of the dam and the
pond would contribute to the stability of the structure and the rate at which
the dam could be safely enlarged. This overestimation resulted from the use
of inaccurate assumptions with respect to the rate at which water in the soils
underlying the tailings dam would dissipate over time. The second deﬁcien
cy relates to the use of inaccurate design values with respect to the frictional
resistance of the blue marl (clay) formation to shear or sliding failure that
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did not take into account all of the available laboratory test data. The third
deﬁciency relates to the use of safety ratios and material strength properties
that did not sufﬁciently reﬂect the degree of conservatism necessary when
dealing with a material such as marl which is brittle and over-consolidated.
The report concludes that, if the deﬁciencies had not occurred, a more con
servative design would have resulted and, in the words of the report, ‘’if that
additional conservatism had been implemented, the failure of the tailings
dam at Aznalcollar need not have occurred.’” (Emphasis added.)
Possible Liability
“Notwithstanding the position of Apirsa, it is possible that ofﬁcers of Apirsa
will have criminal charges laid against them in connection with the tailings
dam failure and be convicted and ﬁned and that they will be held liable, in
whole or in part, for the damages suffered by third parties as a result of the
failure, including the costs incurred by the Spanish governmental authorities
in cleaning up the southern sector below the tailings dam. It is also possible
that Apirsa will have administrative charges laid against it in connection with
the failure and be convicted and ﬁned, either on the basis of strict liability or
because a court concludes that Apirsa was negligent in some way or is vicar
iously responsible for any liabilities of its ofﬁcers.”
“Apirsa believes that the investigation currently underway will eventually
determine and allocate liability for all the damages caused by the failure,
including the damages suffered by Apirsa. Apirsa intends to vigorously pur
sue any claims for damages that it may have against those third parties that
it believes are responsible for the failure.”
“There is a risk that one or more third parties who suffered damages as a
result of the failure could commence an action against the Corporation and
one or more of its subsidiaries as direct or indirect shareholders of Apirsa
alleging that they are not entitled to the limited liability protection provided
to shareholders under Spanish corporate law based on the theory of ‘pierc
ing the corporate veil’ or similar legal theory. There is also a risk that such
third parties could be successful in such an action and that the Corporation
and one or more of its subsidiaries could be held responsible for any liabili
ties of Apirsa. The Corporation has obtained an opinion from Spanish legal
counsel that, although the matter is not free from doubt, in any ﬁnal decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain, the Corporation and one or more of its sub
sidiaries as direct or indirect shareholders of Apirsa should not be held
responsible for any liabilities of Apirsa, based on the legal theory of ‘piercing
the corporate veil’ or any similar legal theory. The opinion relies, in part, on
a certiﬁcate of an ofﬁcer of Apirsa as to certain factual matters with respect
to Apirsa, including its share capital, management structure, ongoing opera
tions, assets and number of employees.”
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Subsequent ﬁlings reported on further consequences of the event as they devel
oped. In summary, Boliden was aware for years prior to the accident of allegations
that there were risks that the dam might fail because it was warned by its own engi
neering employee and by its engineering consultant. It was aware that liquids were
seeping through the dam and responded with studies, tests, monitoring, and inspec
tions. Its own monitoring equipment detected movement within the dam well before
it failed. Although it initially claimed that the dam failed through force majeure, it
eventually conceded that the design and construction were at fault. Prior to the dam’s
failure, however, the company never disclosed to investors that this was a material risk
and a known uncertainty.
Royal Oak Mining – The Giant Mine
The Event

109

Royal Oak Mines Inc. 10-Q
Quarterly Report, 11-16-98.

Royal Oak Mining, Limited, declared bankruptcy in April 1999, citing low gold prices,
leaving behind substantial unfunded and undisclosed environmental liabilities at its
mining properties. Notable among them was the Giant Mine in Yellowknife, Canada
where 240,000 tons of highly toxic arsenic trioxide remained buried in underground
mining vaults, leaching arsenic into ground and surface waters. Prior to bankruptcy,
Royal Oak’s third quarter 1998 report listed assets totaling $840.3 million and liabilities
totaling $645.8 million, exclusive of the costs of dealing with the arsenic trioxide.109 That
problem was left to the government of Canada and the taxpayers. Recent engineering
estimates of the costs of closure and remediation are approximately $200 million.
Background

The Giant Mine went into production in 1948 using a roasting operation to extract
gold from its arsenopyrite ore, producing arsenic trioxide dust as a waste product.
The arsenic trioxide dust that was collected was blown underground into mined out
and some specially constructed chambers for storage 20 to 75 meters below the sur
face. After 50 years of mining operations, approximately 240,000 tons of arsenic tri
oxide dust had accumulated underground and about 10-13 tons were added every day
over the last few decades. When underground storage began in 1951, it was considered
the best option at the time, based on the occurrence of permafrost and low perme
ability in the bedrock. The storage chambers were located in the zone that had been
dried out by mining activities that lowered the water table but water was ﬂowing in
the chamber areas. This ﬂow was captured by the mine’s collection system and treat
ed prior to discharge to the environment.
However, open pit mining and extensive underground workings around the cham
bers compromised the permafrost. This, together with the permeability of the host
rock and a re-assessment of the rate of mine re-ﬂood has called underground storage
into question as a permanent solution. Arsenic trioxide is soluble in water and there
is evidence of groundwater movement through the rock. Elevated levels of arsenic are
present in the mine water pumped from the underground workings, indicating that
groundwater seepage from the storage chambers is already taking place. The vaults
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where the arsenic is stored underground are a few hundred meters from Great Slave
Lake and threaten the entire Mackenzie River watershed.
The Giant Mine has had several owners over the years. Royal Oak Mines acquired
ownership in 1990 and operated the mine from then until April 1999, when it went
into bankruptcy. The mine is located on land owned by the government of the
Northwest Territories. It was held by Royal Oak Mines, Ltd. under a surface lease
without any security for clean up and reclamation other than a requirement to return
the land in a manner acceptable to the territorial government. The surface clean-up
costs have been estimated at over $8 million.
The Giant Mine was operated pursuant to subsurface mineral leases issued by the
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND). A required fed
eral water license set out conditions related to water use and waste management and
imposed a security bond of $400,000 for abandonment and reclamation. The license
also called for studies and actions leading to a management plan for the arsenic tri
oxide stored underground. The same requirements were in the previous license and
were not fulﬁlled by Royal Oak. It is remarkable that the government authorities
allowed Royal Oak to operate the mine for nine years without an approved plan to
deal with 240,000 tons of arsenic or a bond to ensure implementation.
At low gold prices, Giant Mine became a break-even operation that required a
large infusion of capital to bring it up to modern-day standards for worker safety, efﬁ
ciency, and pollution control. Royal Oak Mines went into receivership in April 1999
with no provisions to deal with the arsenic trioxide at the Giant Mine. The arsenic
problem was left to the federal government. The DIAND Minister initially indicated
that the federal government would not accept responsibility for the clean up required
at Giant. However, in late 1999, the receivers, the federal government and Miramar
Mining Corporation (the owner of the other gold mine in Yellowknife) negotiated an
agreement that saw the federal government take over the property. The assets were
then sold to Miramar with the federal government retaining all of the pre-existing
environmental liability. The underground mining operation at Giant resumed in
March 2000 with the ore trucked to the nearby Miramar mill. As long as the proper
ty is proﬁtable and remains in production, Miramar will provide a relatively small
contribution to a fund that will assist with environmental remediation.110
DIAND undertook at least 25 studies to ﬁnd a solution to the problem of the
underground arsenic, starting in 1997, spending more than $750,000 as a result of
Royal Oak’s inaction. Few, if any, satisfactory options have been found.111 Several pre
liminary options were explored, ranging in cost from $70 million to over $1.7 billion.
Most of the permanent remediation options are of dubious feasibility. Encapsulation
in cement would require excessive amounts of cement and would not work at the
high concentrations of arsenic in the waste. Extraction would be difﬁcult to accom
plish without endangering workers’ health, since arsenic trioxide can be lethal if
inhaled or absorbed through the skin, and extraction would leave open the question
of suitable long-term surface storage. Reﬁning the extracted waste into a commercial
product of 99.5 percent purity would be expensive and the market (almost entirely for
wood preservatives) has virtually disappeared.
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Leaving the arsenic trioxide in place underground is now considered is the best
short-term option. This requires the mine water to be pumped to the surface and
treated in an efﬂuent treatment plant until the preferred long-term management
strategy can be determined. Just running the pumps, along with other efforts to
reduce the ﬂow of water through the mine, costs the federal government $3.6 million
a year.
In the long term, the main issues associated with underground disposal are perpet
ual pumping and treatment and preventing the chambers from ﬂooding. At present,
after ten years of engineering studies, DIAND is supporting a plan to freeze the arsenic
underground and let the arctic permafrost hold it in place. It will be the ﬁrst time it
has ever been tried and, if successful, it will be one of the longest and most expensive
environmental cleanups ever undertaken in Canada, all at public expense. The plan
involves sinking pylons to the level of the lowest arsenic chamber and using active
refrigeration to restore the permafrost destroyed by decades of mining. The siphons,
which require no outside power to operate, would then keep the ground frozen. Water
would slowly be ﬂooded back into the mine, freezing and immobilizing the entire area.
The entire process would take 20 years and cost the taxpayer somewhere between $90
million and $120 million.112 Even under this scenario, the pumps would have to keep
running until the arsenic has leached out of backﬁlled chambers and vaults, which
adds an additional $100 million in discounted present costs to the bill.
Disclosures

Royal Oak never recognized a liability for reclamation of the stored arsenic trioxide
nor did it discuss the problem in its ﬁnancial reports. It did provide for reclamation
of the surface area under the terms of its lease. According to language in its 1997 and
1998 annual ﬁnancial ﬁling:
“Where estimated reclamation and closure costs are reasonably
determinable, the Company has recorded a provision for environmental
liabilities based on management’s estimate of these costs. Such estimates are
subject to adjustment based on changes in laws and regulations and as
additional information becomes available.”
“The Company is not able to determine the impact of future changes in
environmental laws and regulations, which are generally becoming more
restrictive, on its operations and future ﬁnancial position due to the
uncertainty surrounding the ultimate form such changes may take.
Insurance against certain liabilities for environmental pollution or other
hazards as a result of exploration and production has not generally been
available at reasonable cost to the Company. Absent such insurance, the
Company’s assets are directly exposed to unknown and unforeseen, but
potential, liabilities for environmental claims and regulations. The
satisfaction of any such liabilities could reduce resources otherwise available
for other business purposes. Nevertheless, the Company believes that it has
made adequate ﬁnancial provisions for the costs associated with mine
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closures and reclamation, and is of the opinion that any changes to
environmental laws and regulations in the future should not have a material
effect on the Company.” (Emphasis added.)
“RECLAMATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION: . . . In
Ontario, the Northwest Territories and British Columbia the Company is
required to post security against all or part of the estimated costs of such
reclamation. The Company has completed and ﬁled reclamation plans for all
of its active operations. Reclamation plans have also been prepared for most
of the Company’s inactive mine sites, and reclamation is well advanced at
many of these sites. Although the ultimate amount of the obligation to be
incurred is uncertain, the Company has currently estimated these future
costs to be $41.2 million. The Company has accrued $24.7 million of recla
mation and closure costs through December 1997 and will charge the
remaining amount to operations, over the remaining lives of its operations,
on a unit-of-production basis. At December 31, 1997, the Company had recla
mation deposits of $14.3 million of cash and cash equivalents restricted for
reclamation purposes. The Company believes that the current salvage value
of its assets at its various mine sites will be sufﬁcient to fund the majority of
these reclamation costs.”
Of that $41 million, $9.4 million was on account of the Giant Mine, presumably for
surface reclamation. However, Royal Oak did refer to the arsenic trioxide problem at
the Giant Mine in its Water License Annual Report for 1998:
Revisions to Contingency Plan and Abandonment & Restoration Plan
“The Contingency Plan was thoroughly revised and submitted to the Water
Board in August 1998. The plan was approved by the Water Board in October,
with a request for the inclusion of some additional speciﬁc information. Due
to limited resources, this additional information has not yet been appended
to the plan.”
The Abandonment & Restoration Plan for the site was thoroughly revised by
EBA Engineering Consultants Ltd. and Royal Oak Mines, and submitted to
the Water Board on December 2, 1998. A one-month extension to the origi
nal submission date was granted by the Water Board. The document includ
ed a revision to the estimated reclamation liability, calculated using the
Reclaim Version 3.1 software. The speciﬁc ﬁnancial liability of the arsenic tri
oxide concentrate stored underground was excluded from this cost estimate,
since the research being conducted on removal, processing and chemical sta
bilization methods for the material has not yet yielded ﬁrm conclusions on
the technical viability of the methods being considered.” (Emphasis added.)
In summary, despite the fact that Canadian government authorities allowed Royal
Oak to operate the Giant Mine for nine years without an approved plan to deal with
the arsenic trioxide problem or a security bond to ensure that the plan would be
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carried out, it is difﬁcult to conceive that, seen through the eyes of Royal Oak’s
management, the 240,000 tons of lethal arsenic trioxide in the mine’s vaults did not
represent a known uncertainty with potentially material ﬁnancial consequences.
However, in its public disclosures, investors would ﬁnd no reference or estimate of the
very large ﬁnancial liability that the stored arsenic trioxide represented, a liability that
subsequently has been estimated in the $200 million range. Were these estimates
disclosed, the true state of Royal Oak’s balance sheet would have been clear well
before its declaration of bankruptcy in April 1999.
Dakota Mining Company – Gilt Edge Mine
The Event
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In July 1999 the Dakota Mining Company ﬁled for bankruptcy under Canadian law.
At that time, its Gilt Edge gold mine in South Dakota faced a serious problem with
acid mine drainage and had 130 million gallons of acid mine wastewater stored in pits
on the site. The state’s estimate of reclamation costs then exceeded $13 million, against
which it held a cash bond from the company of $6.2 million and a demand note for
the balance.
After the company abandoned the site, the state government proposed it as a
Superfund site on the National Priorities list. It was included in 2000. The federal gov
ernment estimated that it would cost between $23 and $27 million to reclaim the site.
To date, the state of South Dakota has already spent approximately $27 million on
reclamation. An estimated $18 million more will be needed in order to ﬁnish the job.113
Background

The Gilt Edge Mine site near Deadwood, South Dakota, was mined by several com
panies starting in the late 1800s. Most of these were small underground gold mines.
Mining continued sporadically up until 1941, generating piles of acidic tailings that
continually discharged acidic and metals-laden water into the nearby creek.
Gilt Edge, Inc., a subsidiary of Brohm Resources, Inc., was granted a state largescale mining permit in 1986 for the Gilt Edge Mine, a gold heap leach project. On
January 15, 1987, Gilt Edge, Inc. underwent a corporate name change to Brohm
Mining Corporation. In 1993, in another reorganization, the company changed its
name to Dakota Mining Corporation, which was incorporated in Canada and had its
business ofﬁces in Denver, Colorado. Brohm became a wholly owned subsidiary
incorporated in South Dakota. Brohm began construction of the Gilt Edge Mine in
1987 and completed mining the original reserves in 1992. Despite existing evidence of
acidity and the presence of sulﬁde rocks, the original cash bond for reclamation was
based on mining non-acid generating rock and totaled $1.2 million. During opera
tions, waste rock containing enough sulﬁde minerals to generate acid was mined.
Acid drainage from the waste dump was detected in 1993.
On April 19, 1993, in response to the acid problem, the South Dakota Department
of Environment and Natural Resources issued Brohm a Notice of Violation and
Order that required Brohm to develop a mitigation plan. On March 16, 1995, the
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Board of Minerals and Environment approved the plan. The acid drainage problem
raised the 1995 estimated cost of reclamation and reclamation bond to $8.4 million,
seven times the original bond of $1.2 million. Due to its ﬁnancial difﬁculties, Brohm
was only able to provide an additional $1.0 million cash bond. To cover the rest of the
increase, the Board of Minerals and Environment approved a $6.2 million Demand
Note based on the net worth of Dakota Mining Corporation.
In 1996 the Board of Minerals and Environment approved Brohm’s new large scale
mine permit application for the Anchor Hill Project, which is adjacent to, but sepa
rate from, the Gilt Edge Mine. The Anchor Hill Project was projected to provide cash
ﬂow for Brohm to complete reclamation of the Gilt Edge site.
The Anchor Hill Project was divided into two phases: Phase I on privately held
land and Phase II on a site that encroached on U.S. Forest Service land. The state per
mit for both phases was approved on January 16, 1996. Because the second phase
encroached on 37 acres of U.S. Forest Service land, it was subject to the federal
National Environmental Policy Act process. The required Environmental Impact
Statement was ﬁnally approved by the Forest Service in the fall of 1997 but was
appealed by several environmental groups. The Forest Service withdrew its approval
of the EIS on February 18, 1998.
Brohm stopped mining Phase I of Anchor Hill in August 1997 and stopped con
tributing to the reclamation cash bond. Gold production from ore on the leach pads
ceased in January 1998. Thereafter, the company laid off 79 employees, leaving 13 to
manage the water treatment plant and other facilities. On May 21, 1998, Brohm noti
ﬁed DENR that it no longer had funding to maintain the mine site and that it planned
to abandon the site. Because Brohm did not have the money to operate the water
treatment plant, they had ﬁlled all available storage places with acid water.
By 1999 revenues from Phase I of the Anchor Hill Project had funded increases in
the cash bond for the Gilt Edge site from $2.2 million to just over $6.2 million.
However, the estimated reclamation costs had increased to more than $13 million.
On May 29, 1998, Governor Janklow ﬁled suit against Brohm and Dakota. A tem
porary restraining order and preliminary injunction were obtained that compelled
Brohm to continue maintaining the site and to comply with its permits. A creditor
agreed to fund the site in hopes the EIS would be ﬁnalized allowing Phase II mining
to proceed. During the summer of 1998, the Forest Service also issued its second
approval of the Anchor Hill EIS, but environmental groups again ﬁled an appeal.
Brohm’s creditors stopped funding in 1999. The additional pressure from creditors,
along with permitting delays, legal battles and low gold prices, led Dakota in June of
1999 to announce its intention to declare bankruptcy, and in July 1999 Dakota Mining
ﬁled for bankruptcy under Canadian law, leaving behind its un-funded reclamation
obligations.
Disclosure

During the period from 1996 through its bankruptcy ﬁling, Dakota Mining consis
tently underestimated its reclamation liabilities at the Gilt Edge Mine, even relative to
the surety required by the state of South Dakota, which itself was considerably less

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

71

72

silence is golden, leaden, and copper

than the reclamation cost as later established. For example, in the ﬁrst half of 1997, the
South Dakota’s total security requirement was $10.3 to $10.9 million for the Gilt Edge
Mine. By comparison, the company’s 10-K issued during this period stated:
“In April 1993, the DENR issued the Order regarding remediation efforts
related to acid rock drainage at Gilt Edge Mine. The DENR Order remains in
effect and Dakota is in full compliance. The DENR Order principally
requires that, unless discharge water meets certain permitted terms and con
ditions, there shall be no discharge of acid mine drainage. On January 19,
1996, Dakota received ﬁnal approval of an updated and amended reclama
tion plan from the State of South Dakota. Under the conditions of the
revised reclamation plan, Dakota plans to reclaim waste depositories and
other areas by capping these areas with impervious materials available from
the overburden associated with the Anchor Hill oxide deposit. Such capping
will prevent any continued migration of acid mine drainage.”
“Dakota has provided the State of South Dakota with a form of ﬁnancial
assurance in the amount of $7.9 million in connection with the reclamation
and remediation plan in the form of cash deposits of $2.4 million and a
demand note as proof of ﬁnancial assurance in the amount of $5.5 million.
Dakota has estimated that its actual capping costs will approximate $3.2 mil
lion, which costs have been fully accrued at December 31, 1996. Funding of
this obligation will be made from operating cash ﬂow derived from process
ing the Anchor Hill oxide deposit.”
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Analysis section.

“At a future date when Dakota provides notice to the State of South Dakota
that the Gilt Edge Mine will close and that post closure care is to begin,
Dakota will be obligated to convert a portion of its ﬁnancial assurance into a
post-closure fund in a form acceptable to the State to ensure long term treat
ment and maintenance of the site. The amount of the post-closure ﬁnancial
assurance is not expected to be less than $3.0 million although no ﬁnal deter
mination will be made until the mine actually close.”114
Reclamation Costs
“The ultimate amount of the reclamation obligations to be incurred is
uncertain, however the Company estimates these costs to be $6.9 million at
Gilt Edge Mine, $721,000 at Stibnite Mine and $900,000 for the Company’s
40% share at Golden Reward. Of the total $8.4 million in estimated costs,
$6.0 million has been accrued for as of December 31, 1996. The remaining
costs will be accrued as mining continues at Gilt Edge Mine and Stibnite
Mine. However, no assurances can be given that the above estimates accu
rately reﬂect the actual costs of all reclamation activities that may be
required.”
This information was repeated in quarterly 10-Q ﬁlings for the second and third
quarters of 1997. By mid-1998, when the company was disclosing its capital and work
ing capital shortfalls, it disclosed the state government’s successful suit to force it to

yale school of forestry & environmental studies

robert repetto

maintain the Gilt Edge site. However, by that time, the estimated cost of reclamation
had risen to $12.6 million, more than twice the amount in the company’s cash bond.
This increased liability was not disclosed.115
“On May 29, 1998, the State of South Dakota obtained a Temporary
Restraining Order (“TRO”) against a subsidiary of Dakota, Brohm Mining
Corp. (“Brohm”). The TRO requires Brohm to continue to operate water
treatment systems at the Gilt Edge mine in accordance with state mine per
mits. Pending a court hearing scheduled for June 5, 1998, the Company
intends to comply with this order. The Gilt Edge mine is not in operation at
this time.”116
In summary, in the period when the company’s balance sheet and income state
ment were deteriorating, the company understated its reclamation liability at Gilt
Edge by a material amount. According to government ofﬁcials familiar with this case,
although it was faced with the problem for years at Gilt Edge, Dakota Mining down
played its potential liabilities from acid mine drainage in order to avoid scaring off
potential investors.117
Newmont Mining – Midnite Mine
The Event

The Midnite Mine was an open-pit uranium mine on the Spokane Indian reservation
in Washington State. The site contains pits ﬁlled with hundreds of millions of gallons
of contaminated waters, waste rock, and tailings. The mine was owned and operated
by Dawn Mining Company, of which Newmont Mining is majority owner. In April
1998, the EPA began an Expanded Site Inspection (ESI) that conﬁrmed the elevated
level of contamination; also at this time, Newmont, in agreement with the Bureau of
Land Management, conducted limited data collection. In February 1999 the EPA pro
posed that Midnite be added to the National Priority List as a Superfund site and a
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) began. Data collections continued
from the fall 1999 to spring 2000. On May 11, 2000, EPA listed the Midnite Mine site
on its NPL.
Background

Newmont Mining Corporation owns 51 percent of the Dawn Mining Company
(DMC), which operated the Midnite Mine, an open-pit uranium mine near
Wellpinit, Washington from 1955 – 1981. During mine operations, about three million
tons of 0.2 percent uranium oxide ore, 2.5 million tons of low-grade ore (protore),
and approximately 33 million tons of waste rock were dug up from six pits. Some of
the most radioactive ore was uncovered just prior to the mine closure and is still
exposed. When this ore, which contains sulﬁdes and pyrites, is exposed to oxygen and
water, it forms sulfuric acid. As the acid percolates through the ore, it leaches urani
um and other heavy metals into the open pits and into the groundwater. During the
1980s, approximately 500 million gallons of acidic water ﬁlled the open pits, threat
ening to overtop the pits and ﬂush acidic wastes into nearby Blue Creek.
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
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After excavations ceased in 1981, two of the six pits were left open and have col
lected seep water. The other four were backﬁlled with waste rock from the mine.
Protore and waste rock piles lie throughout the 320 acres disturbed by mining. In the
decade following closure (i.e., from 1981-1991) the former U.S. Bureau of Mines and
the U.S.Geological Survey conducted site inspections that documented heavy metals
and radionuclides in the seeps, groundwater, and pit water at the mine.
After 1981, Dawn Mining Company (DMC) operated an onsite mill to extract ura
nium from sludge and other remaining ores. Waste from this process was dumped
into a lined tailings disposal pond. In 1991, the lease to DMC was terminated and a
formal mine reclamation plan was required. Since 1992, Dawn has been collecting and
treating surface water to control contaminated mine drainage. Water is treated on-site
and discharged, under an NPDES permit, into a surface drainage. DMC’s reclamation
plan, submitted in 1994, proposed accepting radioactive wastes from other states for
processing and disposal at the mill. It met with community challenges and was not
accepted by the state. Although a revised plan has been tied up in legal contests,
nonetheless DMC did obtain licenses for reclamation and closure activities from the
State of Washington in 1996. DMC was required to post reclamation bonds of $10
million for the mill site and $9.7 million for the mine site, but only $1.0 - $3.2 million
is currently in the reclamation fund. In comparison, the cleanup and reclamation cost
of the mill and mine has been estimated in press reports at $120 to $240 million.
In April 1998, the EPA began an Expanded Site Inspection (ESI) that conﬁrmed the
elevated level of contamination. Also at this time, Newmont, in agreement with the
Bureau of Land Management, conducted some data collection. In February 1999 the
EPA proposed that Midnite be added to the National Priorities List and a Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS) began. This proposal carried important ﬁnan
cial implications for Newmont, the parent company, because CERCLA’s provisions
for joint and several liability greatly increased the likelihood that it, as the majority
owner of Dawn Mining, would be held liable for remediation costs at the Midnite
Mine and possibly the entire cost.
Data collection continued from the fall 1999 to spring 2000. On May 11, 2000, EPA
listed the Midnite Mine site on its National Priorities List. The second phase data col
lection of the RI/FS began in the fall of 2000 and continued to fall 2001. Data from
Newmont, primarily related to onsite elements, was incorporated in “scoping the
work.” EPA was expected to complete the RI/FS study at the end of 2003. In December
2003 EPA released a report that outlined clean-up alternatives but did not contain
cost estimates.
Disclosures

Newmont has promptly disclosed material events at the Midnite mine as they
occurred. Going back to the ﬁrst quarter 10-Q ﬁling in 1994, for example, the compa
ny disclosed that the state government had not accepted Dawn’s reclamation plan,
which Dawn was therefore revising. It also stated that
“Dawn does not have sufﬁcient funds to pay for the reclamation plan it pro
posed, for any alternative plan, or for the closure of its mill. The corpora
yale school of forestry & environmental studies
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tion’s best estimate for the future costs related to these matters is included in
the accrued liability for environmental matters, as previously discussed. The
Department of Interior previously notiﬁed Dawn that when the lease was
terminated, it would seek to hold Dawn and the Corporation liable for any
costs incurred as a result of Dawn’s failure to comply with the lease and
applicable regulations. If asserted, the Corporation will vigorously contest
any such claims.”118
Elsewhere in the ﬁling, it was indicated that $61.6 million had been accrued for
environmental obligations related to former mining activities, including Midnite.
This amount ﬂuctuated in later reports.
Subsequent ﬁlings updated this information with varying amounts for accrual. In
the third quarter of 1994, the company disclosed that it had submitted revised recla
mation plans and in the ﬁrst quarter of 1995 it revealed that DMC received a license
from the state for its mill closure plan, but it was being contested by third parties. In
the second quarter of 1996, Newmont disclosed that: “The Department of Interior has
begun an ESI to analyze DMC’s proposed plan and to consider alternatives to the
company plan.” Nine months later, the 10-Q stated that: “In March 1997, a
Washington superior court upheld DMC’s license for reclamation activities, but there
are further legal appeals.”
As the federal government moved toward inclusion of the Midnite Mine in the
Superfund remediation program, Newmont noted the various phases in rather non
speciﬁc language: In its ﬁrst quarter 10-Q in 1998, just before EPA announced its
Expanded Site Investigation, it disclosed that “Other government agencies also might
attempt to hold the Company liable for further remediation and reclamation at the
mine or mill site.” In its third quarter ﬁling, after the EPA action, it stated that: “EPA
may become more involved in the process.” In its 1998 10-K report, after EPA had pro
posed the site for the NPL on February 16, 1999, the company disclosed, “In early 1999,
the EPA proposed that the mine be included in the National Priorities List under CER
CLA. If asserted, the Company cannot reasonably predict the likelihood or outcome of
any future action against Dawn or the Company arising from this matter.”119
Not until the ﬁrst quarter of 1999 did Newmont speciﬁcally mention the ongoing
ESI study:
“The Department of Interior has commenced an Environmental Impact
Study to analyze Dawn’s proposed plan and to consider what type of mine
reclamation plan may be selected by the Department of Interior. Dawn does
not have sufﬁcient funds to pay for the reclamation plan it proposed, for any
alternative plan, or for the closure of its mill. The Department of Interior
previously notiﬁed Dawn that when the lease was terminated, it would seek
to hold Dawn and the Company liable for any costs incurred as a result of
Dawn’s failure to comply with the lease and applicable regulations. In early
1999, the EPA proposed that the mine be included on the National Priorities
List under CERCLA. If asserted, the Company will vigorously contest any
such claims. The Company cannot reasonably predict the likelihood or out
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come of any future action against Dawn or the Company arising from this
matter. Dawn has received a license for a mill closure plan that could gener
ate funds to close and reclaim both the mine and the mill. The license is
being challenged by third parties.”120
In its following 10-K annual report for 1999, Newmont discussed the government's
inclusion of Midnite on the NPL: “Other government agencies have asserted that the
Company is liable for future reclamation or remediation work at the mine or mill site.
In mid-2000, the mine was included on the NPL under CERCLA. The Company will
vigorously contest any claims as to its liability. The Company cannot reasonably pre
dict the likelihood or outcome of any future action against Dawn or the Company
arising from this matter.”121
In the following year’s 10-K, the company mentioned that the RI/FS had begun
and moderated its position as to liability: “In mid-2000, the mine was included on
NPL and EPA has initiated a RI/FS under CERCLA to determine environmental
conditions and remediation options at the site. The EPA has asserted that Dawn and
the Company are liable . . ..”122
A year later, the company’s annual report further modiﬁes its potential liability:
“At a third site in the U.S., an inactive uranium mine and mill formerly
operated by a subsidiary of Newmont, remediation work at the mill is
ongoing, but remediation at the mine is subject to dispute and has not
commenced. The environmental standards that may ultimately be imposed
at this site as a whole remain uncertain and there is a risk that the costs of
remediation may exceed the provision Newmont’s subsidiary has made for
such remediation by a material amount. Whenever a previously
unrecognized remediation liability becomes known or a previously
estimated cost is increased, the amount of that liability or additional cost is
expensed and this can materially reduce net income in that period.”123
However, in subsequent ﬁlings through 2003, the company has maintained that
since remediation requirements at the Midnite have not been ﬁnally decided, it can
not estimate its potential liability and intends vigorously to contest claims against it.
Since the EPA had not completed its RI/FS by the end of 2003, even to the extent
of releasing the estimated costs associated with its retained remediation alternatives,
and had not issued a Record of Decision, Newmont could plausibly claim that it
could not estimate its potential liability. However, when the Midnite Mine was put
under CERCLA’s provisions, the company became subject to speciﬁc SEC and FASB
disclosure requirements, as discussed in a prior section of this report. Those
requirements prohibited the company from deferring disclosure until a single cost
estimate had been established and required it to provide a range of possible liabilities
if such a range could reasonably be estimated. By the end of 2003 Newmont had not
provided even such a range of potential reclamation costs, although the Midnite
Mine had been a Superfund site for three years. In late 2003 an asset management
company ﬁled a shareholder resolution with Newmont calling for fuller disclosure of
environmental liabilities.
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conclusions
The large majority of the case studies in this report reveal a common deﬁciency in
disclosure. Recall the requirement in Canadian securities law and regulation that “If
an environmental risk or uncertainty is necessary for an understanding of the Issuer’s
ﬁnancial condition, changes therein, or results of operations, it should be disclosed
under Part III, MD&A, Item 1(1)(3), para. 108, with particular emphasis on risks in the
next two years.”124
Recent guidance issued by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants on
MD&A disclosures emphasizes companies’ obligations to provide management’s
assessment of future value drivers and material trends and uncertainties, giving
investors a realistic portrayal of the business outlook and prospects as seen by
management. Securities regulations in the United States contain equivalent
requirements.
These ten case studies investigated events that were ﬁnancially material, some to
the extent that they involved bankruptcy of the company involved. In nearly all of the
cases, the underlying risks and uncertainties that resulted in the events were known
to management but were not disclosed or discussed in the companies’ MD&A ﬁlings
sufﬁciently to provide investors a realistic portrayal of the risks. In most cases they
were simply not mentioned at all.
These ﬁndings reinforce the calls that have been made in recent years by investor
groups and public interest groups for improved disclosure of environmental
information. They add to the evidence available from other studies that disclosure
practices in many environmentally sensitive industries have been inadequate. They
support the claims that enforcement efforts by securities regulators in both the
United States and Canada need to be strengthened in order to secure better
compliance with relevant disclosure requirements. Finally, they also support recent
pronouncements by accounting standards bodies and securities regulators calling for
improvements by listed companies in their Management Discussion & Analysis of
known material risks and uncertainties stemming from environmental and other
business exposures.
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